The Capital As Power Approach. An Invited-then-Rejected Interview with Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan by Bichler, Shimshon & Nitzan, Jonathan
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 2020/02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Capital As Power Approach 
An Invited-then-Rejected Interview with 
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 
 
 
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 
 
 
June 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://capitalaspower.com/?p=3925  
 
WORKING PAPERS ON 
CAPITAL AS POWER 
1 
 
Dedicated to F.D. and his colleagues,  
whose science and humanity made this interview possible. 
 
 
 
The Capital As Power Approach  
An Invited-then-Rejected Interview with  
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 
 
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan1 
 
Jerusalem and Montreal 
June 2020 
 
 
bnarchives.net / Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) 
 
Preface 
 
This interview was commissioned in October 2019 for a special issue on ‘Accumulation and 
Politics: Approaches and Concepts’ to be published by the Revue de la régulation. We submitted 
the text in March 2020, only to learn two months later that it won’t be published.  
The problem, we were informed, wasn’t the content, which everyone agreed was ‘highly 
interesting and stimulating’. It was the format. To begin with, the text was suddenly deemed 
‘too long’. Although the length was agreed on beforehand, the special-issue editors – or maybe 
it was their bosses on the Editorial Board – now insisted that we cut it by no less than two-
thirds. They also instructed us to make our answers more ‘interview-like’ and ‘personal’. Fi-
nally and perhaps most tellingly, they demanded that we change our ‘tone’, which they found 
‘unfair’ and ‘one-sided’. Translation: we should take a hike.  
This encounter with two-minded editors wasn’t our first. The added epilogue at the end of 
this interview, titled ‘Manuscripts Don’t Burn’, sketches our history with Jekyll & Hyde editors 
who have often used ‘length’ and ‘tone’ to reject articles they’ve invited but can’t stomach.  
But first, the original interview, in full. 
 
  
 
1 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan teach political economy at colleges and universities in Israel and Canada, 
respectively. All of their publications are available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net). 
Work on this interview was partly supported by the SSHRC. 
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1. You are both known for having proposed a new way of envisaging the role played by accu-
mulation within capitalism: the Capital as Power thesis, or CasP. Could you restate the main 
arguments of the CasP thesis? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. The CasP approach is radically different from conventional political econ-
omy. In the conventional view, mainstream as well as heterodox, capital is seen a ‘real’ eco-
nomic entity engaged in the production of goods and services, and capitalism is thought of as 
a mode of production and consumption. CasP rejects this framework. Capital, it argues, is not 
a productive economic entity, but a symbolic representation of organized societal power writ 
large, and capitalism should be analysed not as a mode of production and consumption, but 
as a mode of power. 
These are foundational claims. They go to the very heart of political economy, and they 
have far-reaching implications. So far-reaching, in fact, that if we accept them, we have to 
rewrite, often from scratch, much of the theory, history and possible futures of the capitalist 
order.  
CasP questions the key building blocks of political economy: the underlying units of utils 
and socially necessary abstract labour; the anthropological starting points of the individual 
(liberalism), class (Marxism) and state (fascism/statism); the bifurcations of economics from 
politics and the real from the financial sphere of the economy; the Marxist distinction between 
material base and superstructure; the use of equilibrium in the study society; the driving forces 
of utility and profit maximization. The list goes on.2 
Replacing these building blocks with CasP’s often reveals a very different capitalist reality. 
Take inflation. Most political economists think of it as growth-driven and therefore see stagfla-
tion – i.e., inflation in the midst of stagnation – as anomalous. CasP puts this view on its head. 
It shows that inflation almost always appears with some measure of stagnation and crisis, 
which means that stagflation is not an outlier, but the general rule. The difference between 
these two views comes from their opposing starting points. In received convention, inflation 
is an aggregate economic phenomenon determined by excess aggregate demand (relative to 
aggregate supply), validated by growing liquidity (too much money chasing too few commod-
ities) and ultimately neutral in its impact (having no lasting effect on the so-called real econ-
omy). CasP’s view is completely different. Inflation, it argues, is neither aggregate nor neutral. 
Rather than an alienated economic phenomenon, it is a broad societal regime that leverages 
sabotage and stagnation in order to restructure capitalized power through the systemic redis-
tribution of income and the differential accumulation of assets.3  
Or consider the penal system. Whereas conventional political economy treats jails and the 
correctional population as ‘social entities’ that connect only indirectly and often marginally 
with the ‘economy’, in CasP the penal system is an important form of strategic sabotage that 
 
2 We avoid postist discourses of race, gender, ethnicity and culture that deny the very possibility of universal sci-
ence. 
3 Nitzan (1992) and Nitzan and Bichler (2000b; 2002: Ch. 4; 2009: Ch. 16). 
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secures growing inequality and in so doing propels – and becomes part of – the differential 
capitalization of power.4  
Another example is Middle East ‘Energy Conflicts’ (our term). These conflicts are usually 
examined separately, often by different social sciences, to yield discipline-based, episode-
unique explanations. On the oil side, energy policies, the intrigues of politicians and the activ-
ities of state officials are usually dealt with by international relationists; oil production, prices 
and trade are monopolized by macroeconomists; individual corporations and sectors are han-
dled by applied microeconomists and finance specialists; and the interaction between oil, reli-
gion and ethnicity is dominated by experts of culture. Similarly on the conflict side of military 
spending and the arms trade: the interaction of armament, interstate bellicosity and the balance 
of power belongs to international relations specialists; the effect of armament on overall trade, 
the balance of payments, employment and growth rates is the domain of economists; and the 
impact of armament on domestic strife is the purview of political scientists and culturalists. 
Every aspect of these conflicts seems tucked within its own protected niche, mediated by its 
own concepts and methods and dominated by its gatekeeping experts.  
CasP research subsumes all of these unique features under the unifying logic of global 
differential accumulation, showing how, over the past half-century, the relative profits of the 
leading oil and armament companies have systematically predicted – and in turn have been 
fuelled by – these very conflicts, regardless of their singularities.5 
Similarly with the ongoing ‘blockbusting’ of modern cinema. Liberals tend to classify this 
process as an aspect of culture, while Marxists see it mostly as part of the superstructure or the 
capitalist production of culture. By contrast, CasP research shows it to be a leading driver of 
differential accumulation, demonstrating how the major entertainment conglomerates have 
learned to use blockbusters to kill the uncertainty of artistic creativity, and all that to reduce 
their differential risk and boost their differential capitalization.6  
For CasP to become a viable theory, this type of research must penetrate and re-examine 
every corner of capitalism, so it’s a huge undertaking – and, in that sense, one that has barely 
begun. True, the CasP project has grown significantly over the past decade, attracting new 
researchers, generating important studies and giving rise to novel theoretical ideas.7 But it is 
yet to achieve critical mass. Not too many people know about it, and relatively few engage 
with and debate it. Although highly ambitious and in our view promising, it remains over-
shadowed by liberalism, Marxism and the vast sprawls of postism. 
However, this situation can change, and pretty quickly. 
The reason is that political economy these days suffers from acute schizophrenia: most of 
its practitioners recognize that power is everywhere, that it matters a great deal, and that it 
must be incorporated into their explanations – yet, their theoretical framework prohibits them 
from doing so: they cannot make the full spectrum of power truly integral to their analysis. 
 
4 Bichler and Nitzan (2014b). 
5 Bichler and Nitzan (1996b, 2015b, 2017a), Bichler, Nitzan and Rowley (1989), Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan 
(1989), Nitzan and Bichler (1995; 2002: Ch. 5), Nitzan, Rowley and Bichler (1989), Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan 
(1989).  
6 McMahon (2013, 2015, 2018). 
7 For a detailed overview, see Bichler and Nitzan (2018). 
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They do bring power in, of course; they have to in order to remain relevant. But they do so in 
a limited way and only from the outside, as an ‘exogenous’ entity that ‘distorts’ the power-free 
aspects of their theory. 
And that’s a patch up, not a remedy. As we see it, the schizophrenia is rooted in the very 
foundations of conventional political economy and in that sense is incurable. The only way to 
eliminate it is to build political economy on new foundations. And since power is growing 
more rather than less important, the need for new foundations becomes ever more acute. 
Sooner or later something will have to give – and when it does, CasP will suddenly become 
the obvious, ‘we-have-known-it-all-along’ solution.8  
 
2. Could you explain this schizophrenia in some detail? To start with, why does political econ-
omy have to integrate power into its very core? Why can it not keep it as an ‘external distor-
tion’? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Because capitalism in general and capital in particular are constituted by 
power.  
Of course, being constituted by power is not unique to capitalism. All modes of power – 
from the ancient city states and empires of the Near East, to feudalism, to communist dicta-
torships, to capitalism – are constituted in this way, by definition. But whereas all other hier-
archical regimes glorify power, capitalism denies it. According to its ideologues, the very na-
ture of capitalism – its quest for wellbeing and freedom combined with its disciplining compe-
tition – serves to defuse power, if not destroy it altogether. 
But historical perspectives change. The capitalist annulment of power, which seemed like 
a great promise in the days of John Locke and Adam Smith, was later pronounced hypocritical 
by Karl Marx and nowadays echoes like a bad joke. Contrary to the expectations of early 
liberals, power is nowhere limited and contained; on the contrary, it’s omnipresent and it ex-
pands. Capitalist corporations are highly hierarchical, bigger than ever before, bundled into 
large coalitions and networked with various non-corporate entities. Similarly with govern-
ments. They too are hierarchical, large and growing. Their direct expenditures account for 20-
40% of GDP, depending on the country, and if we add their various transfers, the overall 
numbers are even bigger. Complement these spending and transfers with the full range of pol-
icies, regulations, litigation, policing, wars, propaganda and education, and you find govern-
ment power embedded in every aspect of capitalism.  
And that’s just for starters. Modern forms of communication, computation and modelling 
enable these power structures – whether private, public or governmental – to surveil, map, 
predict and shape the hearts and minds of their subjects. Also, over the past century, the levers 
of hierarchical power have multiplied dramatically: whereas in the past, this power relied 
mostly on threat and violence, nowadays it’s greatly boosted by temptation and co-optation. 
 
8 There is a famous saying – attributed in various versions to Arthur C. Clarke, William James, Arthur Schopen-
hauer, Leo Szilard and Sidney Webb, among others – that goes like this: every new truth passes through three 
stages. In the beginning the experts ridicule it as ‘nonsense’. Then they dismiss it as ‘trivial’. And in the end we 
learn that they ‘knew it all along’. 
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Lastly and crucially, the all-encompassing ritual of capitalization relentlessly penetrates and 
continuously incorporates more and more aspects of human activities into its fold. It locks 
even the ruling class – indeed the ruling class more than anyone else – into a power trajectory that 
they feel powerless to counteract. The autonomous subject of the liberal enlightenment has 
become a manipulated object of the capitalist megamachine.9 
Power is not an ‘exogenous’ sideshow. Every dollar’s worth of production, income and 
spending is mobilized by power, while capital, the totalizing institution of capitalism, is a di-
rect expression of power. And since political economy is the study of these processes and en-
tities, it must fuse power, directly and explicitly, into its very theoretical core – that is, into 
capital itself. 
Granted, few political economists would frame the problem in these stark terms. None-
theless, many now realize that something is fundamentally wrong with their discipline. Over 
the past decade, we have heard more and more calls for a major rethinking if not a complete 
rewriting of conventional political economy.10 The 2007-08 global financial crisis and the 
threat of ecological disasters, these critiques argue, have shown political economy, particularly 
its mainstream, as being unable to predict, let alone explain and address, basic socio-environ-
mental processes from financial instability and economic crisis, to growing income inequalities 
and societal disparities, to climate change and ecological degradation. 
Of course, theoretical deficiencies and urgent calls to address them are not new. They first 
surfaced in the late nineteenth century, came into sharp focus in the wake of the Crash of 1929 
and the Great Depression of the 1930s, and led to major revisions – some say ‘revolutions’ – 
including Keynesianism, administered prices, neo-Marxism and critical theory. The thing is 
that these revisions did not solve the conceptual problem, and we very much doubt that newer 
revisions will either.11 
 
  
 
9 The concept of the ‘megamachine’ – invented by Lewis Mumford to analyse the social mechanization of the 
ancient delta civilizations (Mumford 1967) and the modern state (Mumford 1970) – is extended to the study of 
capital in Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 13).  
10 A random sample of discontent, from both left and right, includes Bowles and Carlin (2019), Chang (2010), 
Economist (2009), Fullbrook (2010, 2019), Graeber (2019), Keen (2011, 2017), Lavoie (2018), Mason (2015), 
Morgan and Fullbrook (2019), Orrell (2018), Piketty (2015), Romer (2016), Smith (2016), Stiglitz (2017), 
Varoufakis (2009) and Vine and Wills (2018). 
11 Judging by the frameworks offered by various anti and alter social movements, it seems that, so far, the twenty-
first-century round of alternatives falls far shorter than those that failed to solve the problem in the twentieth. The 
sad truth is that most activists these days cannot be bothered with developing a new theoretical framework, let 
alone with engaging in novel, painstaking research. They much prefer to cut and paste from what is already on 
offer, with the inevitable result being that their struggle is co-opted into the same conceptual framework they seek 
to abolish. See Bichler and Nitzan (2003) Bichler, Nitzan and Di Muzio (2012), Bichler, Nitzan and Dutkiewicz 
(2013) and Debailleul, Bichler and Nitzan (2018). 
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3. What about approaches such as the regulation and social structures of accumulation (SSA) 
schools, behavioural economics and institutionalism more generally? Do they not incorporate 
power into their analysis?  
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Yes, they certainly incorporate power, and often extensively. But they re-
tain a bifurcated worldview. They continue to see capital itself as a material-economic entity 
and therefore end up using power to explain the wrong explanandum. 
Beginning with Quesnay and the Physiocrats, political economists made it a habit to con-
struct various ‘production functions’, as they later came be known, to explain why the econ-
omy grows and who deserves to receive what part of its output. In constructing these functions 
– be they qualitative or (pseudo)quantitative – the theorist would typically identify the im-
portant ‘factors’ of production, (claim) to figure out their distinct productive ‘contributions’ 
and then correlate (figuratively speaking) these (alleged) contributions with the factors’ respec-
tive incomes. Positive correlations would support the current class structure of society, while 
negative correlations would be used to trash it. 
The classicists usually took the side of capital, but their theory was deficient: it treated 
capital as a mere auxiliary to the true factors of production, labour and land, and therefore 
found it difficult to rationalize profit. This glitch was eventually fixed by the neoclassicists, 
whose refurbished production function, courtesy of J.B. Clark, christened capital as a full-
fledged third factor on par with labour and land – and then, inverting cause and effect, cited 
the large incomes of capitalists as ‘proof’ that the capital they owned was highly produc-
tive. . . . Contrary to the liberals, both classical and neoclassical, Marx insisted that there was 
only one productive factor, namely labour, and that the incomes of landlords and capitalists 
represented not the productive contributions of their assets (which were nil), but the economic 
exploitation and political oppression of their workers. 
Focusing specifically on capital 𝐾, we can generalize these debates in reference to Equa-
tion 1. In this equation, accumulation ∆𝐾/𝐾 is seen as a function 𝐹 of different factors of pro-
duction – or economic inputs 𝑒𝑖 – and the main contention is over the relevant factors to be 
included and the precise functional form through which they fuel the growth of capital.   
 
1.    
∆𝐾
𝐾
= 𝐹(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3, … 𝑒𝑛) 
 
By the early twentieth century, though, the debates broadened beyond the economy 
proper. Marxists such as Gramsci, Lukács and members of the Frankfurt School realized that, 
although ownership of the means of production and the production process more broadly re-
mained paramount, the power relations associated with legitimation, and with culture more 
generally, were also crucial. Moreover, these power relations, the critics argued, were not mere 
addenda to, let alone simple derivatives of, the so-called productive base. They had their own 
autonomy – a point that Marcuse would later extend, dialectically, to make artistic creation 
the centrepiece of human autonomy more generally. 
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Eventually, these insights, together with the existentialist revival of the human subject and 
the growing disillusionment with the Soviet Union, helped breach the economic determinism 
of capital accumulation. If during the 1950s the Communist Party excommunicated Hegelian 
heretic Henri Lefebvre for daring to make ‘urban space’ – previously an aspect of the super-
structure – an autonomous historical entity, by the 1970s such transmutations were no longer 
frowned upon. By then, Louis Althusser was already busy ‘overdetermining’ materialist his-
tory with additional, non-economic factors – including ‘ideology’, which he shifted from the 
superstructure over to the productive base. And this relocation, unthinkable during the Party’s 
Stalinist era, was just the beginning. One of Althusser’s students, Nicos Poulantzas, endowed 
the state with ‘relatively autonomy’, while another, Michel Foucault, abandoned economic 
determinism altogether in favour of ergodic power. In parallel, Dependency and World-Sys-
tems theorists such as Gundar Frank, Arghiri Emmanuel, Samir Amin and Immanuel Wal-
lerstein anchored the history of capital accumulation and capitalism more generally in the 
global military expansionism of the European superpowers. The Regulation and SSA schools 
took these conceptual expansions a step further by adding to the equation a far broader extra-
economic input – the ‘mode of regulation’ or ‘social structure of accumulation’. Similarly with 
institutionalism, which argues that economic agents are only partly autonomous (if at all), and 
that their inclinations and behaviour, rational and irrational, are shaped by the slowly evolving 
social institutions into which they are born. 
With these multiple breaches, theorists found many more things to argue about. Accumu-
lation nowadays is seen as determined not only by traditional economic inputs 𝑒𝑖, but also by 
a broad range of extra-economic relations of power 𝑒𝑒𝑗, all mediated through an augmented 
function 𝐴𝐹, as shown in Equation 2:  
 
2.    
∆𝐾
𝐾
= 𝐴𝐹(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3, … 𝑒𝑛; 𝑒𝑒1, 𝑒𝑒2, 𝑒𝑒3, … 𝑒𝑒𝑚) 
 
But one thing remains unchanged. With the bygone exception of Thorstein Veblen, all 
users of Equation 2 – be they neo-Marxists, Gramscians, Regulationists, Dependency and 
World-Systems analysts, poststructuralists, institutionalists or behavioural economists – con-
tinue to treat capital 𝐾 itself as a productive-economic entity and its power determinants as 
external to accumulation proper. In our view, this bifurcation between production and power 
isn’t about to change on its own. And as long as it remains, its adherents will keep barking up 
the wrong tree.  
 
4. Why are you so doubtful of change?  
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Because the bifurcation is structural: you cannot make power at large inte-
gral to a theory whose very framework makes such integration impossible to start with.  
To understand this impossibility, we need to backtrack to the birth of political economy in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Political economy was conceived as the first science 
of society. Rooted in the mechanical worldview of the new secular sciences and the capitalist 
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contestation of feudal power, it was and remains built on three related foundations: (1) a sep-
aration of economics from politics (or more broadly, a distinction between the objective world 
of production and wellbeing and the subjective passions of hierarchical power and violence); 
(2) a mechanical, self-equilibrating model of the economy; and (3) a value theory that breaks 
the economy into ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ spheres and uses the quantities of the former to explain 
those of the latter.12 These foundations, we argue, prevent power from being fully integrated 
into political economy. 
Begin with the first foundation: the duality of economics versus politics.13 
Most people take this duality as natural and obvious. It’s neither. Historically, the separa-
tion of economics from politics can be traced back to the twelfth century in Northern Italy and 
Flanders, where there emerged a new class struggle between an oligarchy of merchants and 
financiers in the growing burgs and the feudal nobility of the agrarian countryside.14 The two 
groups represented totally different modes of power and, indeed, totally different concepts of 
power. Whereas the feudal mode of power legitimized hierarchical privilege sanctified by re-
ligion and backed by naked force, the nascent capitalist mode of power boasted the notion of 
a flat civil order based on rational productivity. While the feudal lords earned their income 
thorough the forceful redistribution of a fixed agricultural pie, the would-be capitalists gener-
ated theirs through the ongoing growth of industry and commerce. 
Initially subservient to the feudal state within which they emerged, the burgs quickly 
started to demand and obtain differential exemptions – or libertates – from feudal rule. In to-
day’s lingo, we could say that they fought to separate and liberate their bourgeois ‘economy’ 
from feudal ‘politics’, and it is this bygone conflict that continues to echo whenever we contrast 
these two terms today. 
Liberals tend to see this separation in black and white: ‘economy – good; politics – bad’. 
And that’s hardly a caricature. In the liberal cosmology, the economy – namely the processes 
of production, consumption, technology, trade, prices and income – is the fertile source of 
society. This is the horizontal realm of individualism, utility, productivity, frugality, rational-
ity, dynamism and freedom, the sphere where personal initiative and mutually beneficial ex-
change propel society forward. By contrast, politics – namely the state and its bureaucracies, 
the law, the police and army – is the vertical domain of authoritarianism and conformism, 
power and coercion, waste and irrationality, corruption and manipulation. 
Prone to mischief, politics should be restricted as much as possible. Ideally, its role should 
be to assist the economy by providing law and order and filling in for the occasional market 
failure – and that’s it. In practice, though, politics always ends up doing more than it is sup-
posed to, causing havoc in the process. According to liberals, politics as such cannot produce 
anything; it can only appropriate and redistribute. And since the economy is assumed efficient 
 
12 The origins and consequences of these foundations are articulated in Bichler and Nitzan (2012b). 
13 Cf. Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 2). 
14 Note that we are not siding here with the so-called ‘Smithian approach’ to the origins-of-capitalism debate – or 
with any of the other approaches for that matter. In fact, we are not at all concerned here with the ‘origins’ debate, 
which is entirely about economics (production versus trade in the early Sweezy-Dobb exchange, and forces versus 
relations of production in the subsequent Brenner Debate). Instead, our discussion deals with the prior question of 
what separated the concepts of economics and politics to start with. 
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to start with, political intervention cannot but distort and undermine this efficiency, making 
the overall economic pie smaller. The obvious antidote for this mishap is laissez faire: for liber-
als, the best society is one with the biggest ‘free’ economy and the smallest and least ‘interven-
tionist’ polity. 
The Marxist view is different, but not entirely. Like liberals, Marxists too distinguish eco-
nomics from politics (or base from superstructure). And they too see the economy, particularly 
production, as the prime mover of capitalism – the sphere where labour creates both the use 
value that sustains society and the surplus value that capitalists appropriate to propel accumu-
lation. Unlike liberals, though, Marxists view the political sphere not as a hindering distortion, 
but as a built-in requirement. The formal separation of economics from politics, they argue, 
legally alienates private property from public control in order to ensure and legitimize the class 
superiority of capitalists over the rest of society. In this way, economics and politics stand as 
the two essential pillars of the capitalist regime – the former generates its exploitation, while 
the latter secures its oppression. 
So, we have a rather unseemly convergence. Although liberals and Marxists reject each 
other’s framework, they appear to agree (albeit for different reasons) that economics and poli-
tics are – and must be – distinctly constituted, and that the economy leads with production and politics 
reacts with redistribution. 
And the question is why? Why do political economists right and left insist on retaining the 
anachronistic separation of economics from politics and the notion that the former dominates 
the later? You can say that liberal defenders of capitalism benefit from this separation and 
prioritization, but what do Marxist critiques of capitalism stand to gain from upholding the 
same view? The answer is largely analytical. As they stand, neither school can afford to rock 
the boat. Without the a priori separation and pecking order of economics and politics, their 
ability to model – and even describe – the social reality breaks down. 
The reason for this breakdown relates to the second foundation of political economy: the 
mechanical, self-equilibrating view of the economy itself. 
This view emerged together – and remains deeply intertwined – with the mechanical cos-
mology of the seventeenth century. Throughout history, human beings, perhaps as a way of 
alienating themselves from nature, have tended to politicize their cosmos, imposing on their 
natural environment the power structures of their own society.15 And this politicization con-
tinues in the liberal-capitalist order. 
Think of the mechanical world, articulated since Machiavelli by Kepler, Galileo, Des-
cartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Leibnitz and above all Newton. The gods of this liberal cosmos 
represent absolute rationality, or natural law. The structure of this natural law is numerical 
and its language mathematical. The universe it gives rise to is flat. The particles that populate 
it have no inherent hierarchy. They don’t obey or submit, but freely interact through attraction 
and repulsion. Their actions and reactions are dictated not by a lineage of differential obliga-
tions, but by universal gravity. They are tuned not to the willful caprice of the Almighty, but 
 
15 On the politicized cosmologies of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, see Frankfort et al. (1946), Kramer (1956, 
1961) and Jammer (1957). 
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to the structured relations between force and counterforce and the invisible power of equili-
brating inertia.  
This flat universe mirrors the flat ideals of liberal society. Reduced to its bare essentials, 
the liberal cosmos is a perfectly competitive market, populated by particles – or actors – each 
of which is too small to significantly affect the overall outcome. The actions of these particles 
– namely the market’s producers and consumers – are determined not by patriarchal responsi-
bilities, but by scarcity – the gravitational force of the social universe. They are repelled from 
and attracted to each other not by feudal obligations, but through the universal utilitarian func-
tions of supply and demand. And they obey not the dictates of hierarchy, but the equilibrating 
force of the invisible hand. 
These mutual reflections help explain why politics and economics must remain distinctly 
constituted, and why politics must be seen as subservient to economics: if they are not, the 
arbitrary character of politics – and of power more generally – is bound to distort if not totally 
annul the rational-mathematical automaticity of the perfectly competitive economy; with 
mathematical rationality gone, liberals lose their universal laws of the economy and Marxists 
their capitalist laws of value, if  not of motion; and with these laws defunct, political economy 
can no longer claim to be the science of society. 
And then there is the third foundation of political economy: value theory.16 
Capitalism is a system denominated, organized and regulated by prices. Any attempt to 
theorize capitalism hinges on the theorist’s ability to understand those prices, which is why 
liberalism and Marxism are each based on a specific theory of value – the utility theory of value 
and the labour theory of value, respectively.17 
As they stand, both value theories rely on a basic distinction, first popularized by David 
Hume, between the ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ spheres of the economy. The real sphere is the domain 
of production and consumption, utility and wellbeing, labour and exploitation. The nominal 
sphere is the realm of money, prices and finance. The common assumption is that everything 
of import happens in the real sphere, which is why economics textbooks, both liberal and 
Marxist, are denominated almost exclusively in ‘real terms’. The nominal sphere is considered 
a mere reflection (and sometimes a facilitating lubricant) of that ‘reality’ and therefore merits 
little or no attention. 
There is only one tiny problem: in reality, the ‘real-term’ quantities of the real economy 
are completely unreal.18 
The native quantities of the real sphere are qualitatively different from each other. Apples 
can be measured in bushels, steel in tonnes, cars in numbers, loans in dollars and computer 
programmes in lines of code.19 But these quantities have no common denominator. Apples 
 
16 Cf. Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Part II) and Bichler and Nitzan (2015a). 
17 Note that only classical Marxism offers a value theory. Neo-Marxian economics has no value theory as such, 
while the cultural and state-theory branches of Marxism reiterate the classical version or eschew value theory alto-
gether.   
18 For more on this unreal reality, see Nitzan (1992: Ch. 5), Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 8), Bichler and Nitzan 
(2015a) and Fix, Bichler and Nitzan (2019). 
19 In principle, the differences can be refined further and further: there are many types of apples, steel, cars, loans 
and computer programmes, so each type can be differentiated and re-differentiated all the way down to its under-
lying molecules and atoms. These finer distinctions only strengthen our point here, so we disregard them.  
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cannot be added to loans, steel to computer programmes, and machines that make microchips 
to those spewing fast-food chips. And since these magnitudes cannot be added, there is no 
straightforward way to aggregate them into larger bundles such as ‘real investment’, ‘real 
GDP’ and the ‘real capital stock’. 
The economists, though, remain unfazed. Every science has its own elementary particles 
– the units that everything else is made of – and so does the science of economics, or so they 
argue. The elementary particle of the liberal universe is the ‘util’, a term coined by Irving Fisher 
to describe the basic unit of hedonic pleasure. In the liberal world, all goods and services, 
regardless of their qualitative differences, can be counted in terms of the utils they generate. 
For instance, if a tractor generates 10 times the utils of a particular software package, its quan-
tity is 10 times larger. And since, according to liberals, all commodities are produced and 
consumed for their utility, we can use their util-generating capacity, countable in universal 
utils, to quantify, relate and aggregate their magnitudes in ‘real’ terms.20 
Marxists make a similar claim. Their elementary particle is SNALT, or socially necessary 
abstract labour time. In their view, commodities can be counted, related and added based on 
the SNALT it takes to produce them. In our example here, the tractor might take 10 times 
more SNALT to produce than the software package, and therefore has 10 times the quantity. 
Armed with these universal quantities, economists then posit a quantity-to-quantity map-
ping, with money prices in the nominal sphere determined by the universal magnitudes of the 
economic reality: in the liberal utility theory of value, prices are proportionate to utils, whereas 
in the Marxist labour theory of value they are proportionate to SNALTs.21 If a liberal tractor 
generates 10 times the utils of a software package, its price will (or should) be 10 times higher, 
and if a Marxist tractor takes 15 times more SNALT to make, its price will (or should) be 15 
times higher. 
And it is here that value theories fall into a trap – in fact, two traps. And both have to do 
with power. 
First, even if these quantity-to-quantity value theories are correct and nominal prices are 
indeed determined by real quantities (and that’s a big if), this determination works only in a 
self-equilibrating perfectly competitive economy whose mechanical laws of supply and de-
mand ensure that the real quantities of utils or SNALT indeed map onto actual money prices. 
If we deviate from this setup, though – that is, if we allow politics, social constraints and the 
full spectrum of power more generally into the picture – the model’s automaticity disintegrates, 
the real-to-nominal mapping dissipates and the utility and labour theories of value break down. 
Their values no longer explain prices. 
And then there is the second, more basic and much more embarrassing difficulty. Unlike 
the underlying quantities of physics (distance, time, mass, electrical charge and heat), utils and 
SNALT are fictitious quanta. Of course, all quantities are creatures of our imagination. But 
 
20 Note that for utils to be universally comparable and additive, consumers must be identical drones (to make their 
utilities interchangeable) and be possessed by income-invariant preferences (so measurement is distribution-neutral). 
Needless to say, these prerequisites make both liberalism and radical autonomy utterly meaningless – though it 
seems that users of ‘real’ economic data, including Marxists, are perfectly OK with sacrificing those ideals in order 
to quantify them (if that sentence makes any sense). 
21 For simplicity, we ignore here differences in Marx’s ‘organic composition of capital’. 
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whereas those of physics can be observed/examined directly or indirectly, utils and SNALT 
can never be. They are forever a matter of belief – a trait that may befit religion and postism, 
but has no place in science. 
The issue here is not that utils and SNALT tax credulity as such; the categories of physics 
are often freakier. But whereas physicists continue to discuss, debate and test their categories 
and whether they still fit their theories – witness the relationship between the ether and light, 
the Higgs boson and mass, the cosmic microwave background radiation and the Big Bang, 
and cosmic rays and the earth’s clouds and climate – political economists no longer deliberate 
theirs. ‘[I]n the interest of science’, writes Albert Einstein, ‘it is necessary over and over again 
to engage in the critique of these fundamental concepts, in order that we may not uncon-
sciously be ruled by them’.22 Value theorists, though, remain unimpressed. While the under-
lying categories of physics are, potentially, always in flux, those of economic value haven’t 
changed since Karl Marx and Irving Fisher. And the reason is simple: whereas every physicist 
with the right equipment and creative acumen can measure and challenge the basic quantities 
of physics, no economist, even the most original, has ever been able to measure the util or 
SNALT content of any commodity whatsoever, let alone in a way that all other economists 
consider objective, or at least refutable. 
This inability is detrimental, to put it politely: without utils and SNALT conventional po-
litical economy cannot quantify the so-called real economy; without such quantification it 
cannot explain prices; and without a measurable real economy and an explanation for prices, 
it cannot understand capitalism. 
Now, if this were the case in physics – i.e., physicists trying to measure gravity without 
mass, or velocity without time – their theories would be scrapped in no time. But not so in 
political economy. Instead, political economists got used to arguing in reverse: rather than using 
unobservable utils and SNALT to explain readily observable nominal prices, they deploy nom-
inal prices to explain (read justify) their utility and SNALT theories of value! Instead of posit-
ing that the util-generating capacity of commodities determines their prices, liberals claim that 
commodity prices reveal to us their util-generating capacity.23 Similarly with Marxists: to get 
their version of this inversion, simply replace ‘util-generating capacity’ with ‘SNALT’.24 
Of course, given that utils and SNALT cannot be observed and examined, let alone meas-
ured, these inverted claims are irrefutable. Moreover – and crucially for our purpose – since 
actual prices are ‘contaminated’ by politics and power more generally, there is no reason why 
they should be proportional to utils and SNALT to start with – although this proposition too 
is conveniently untestable. . . . 
 
22 Einstein (1954: xiv). 
23 Samuelson (1938). 
24 A recent illustration is offered by Tonak (2019) in his paper ‘The Rate of Exploitation (The Case of the iPhone)’. 
The article, which derives its various SNALT-based Marxist categories directly from observed market prices, justi-
fies the inversion as follows: ‘It should be pointed out that any attempt to empirically calculate Marx’s labour theory 
of value must necessarily make assumptions that simplify reality’, adding that, ‘In our view, however, these as-
sumptions – such as that prices reflect values – can be justified and that these simplifications do not exaggerate the 
results’ (p. 31, emphasis added). 
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All in all, then, we have a foundational ‘barrier to integration’: power is everywhere and 
its full spectrum must be incorporated into the core of political economy – yet the very foun-
dations of political economy make such incorporation impossible. If we fuse power at large 
into existing political economy, we eliminate the economy’s presumed automaticity and in so 
doing annul its liberal economic laws and Marx’s capitalist laws of motion. Moreover, in do-
ing so we also pull the rug from under the util and SNALT theories of value. Finally, and most 
embarrassingly, we make it impossible for political economists to quantify and therefore de-
scribe their ‘real economy’ to start with.  
 
5. Have political economists made any progress addressing this impasse? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Not really. At the moment, they’re still trying to have their cake and eat it 
too. They endorse both the fiction of perfect competition and the reality of power – but they 
keep the two sides separate so the contradiction between them remains invisible.   
To illustrate, take the ‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models’ (DSGEs) popular 
among central bankers and economic Nobelists alike. These models typically begin with a 
perfectly competitive setting, which is then ‘augmented’ with afflictions such as (inefficient) 
government policies, various (frictional) costs and assorted (irrational) habits. These additions, 
though, are considered external to the economy, unfortunate ‘shocks’ that distort its pristine 
simplicity from the outside. And since the added misfortunes are assumed exogenous, their 
modellers feel it’s perfectly OK to speak of their power-laden predictions as spontaneous ‘equi-
librium’ outcomes. 
And the same happens in classical Marxism. Marx and his followers don’t deny the pres-
ence of power as such. On the contrary, they emphasize that the class basis of capitalism means 
that seemingly ‘equal’ market relations are in fact exploitative and therefore inherently une-
qual, and that what passes for ‘voluntary’ competitive behaviour is often the consequence of 
coercion and oppression.25 But the real-to-nominal mapping of their value theory applies only 
to an economy whose material base stands separately from its superstructure and that gets 
equilibrated, automatically, by the invisible hand of pure competition. In this context, the in-
troduction of power at large (i.e., beyond the abstract contours of exploitation/oppression) 
typically involves moving from the first ‘transformation problem’ (of labour values to compet-
itive prices) to the second (competitive to market prices). This shift brings in a plethora of 
power relations that quickly decimate the real-to-nominal mapping of values to prices (which, 
incidentally, is why neo-Marxism, including its Monopoly Capital, Dependency and World-
Systems variants, has abandoned such mapping). And yet, if these power relations can be as-
sumed particular (external) rather than inherent (internal), it is still possible – or so it seems 
from the writings of classical Marxists – to speak of the system’s long-term laws of motion. 
Most modellers, though, don’t realize how deeply contradictory their hybrid models are: 
they continue to assume self-equilibrating automaticity despite the admitted presence of arbi-
trary power; and they continue to measure their ‘real’ economic quantities of utils and SNALT 
 
25 For a recent summary, see Palermo (2016). 
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using actual prices, even though this inverted mapping is meaningful (if at all) only if their 
power-augmented economy is . . . untouched by power! 
The consequence of this schizophrenia is a highly unstable, top-heavy pyramid. The nar-
row base of this pyramid is a perfectly competitive economic model in which power is either 
totally absent (in the liberal case) or limited to built-in exploitation (the Marxist version), and 
on which the modellers then erect a top-heavy superstructure of ad hoc, extra-economic power 
relations. Although the specific power relations are often assumed ephemeral, the power su-
perstructure as a whole tends to grow and eventually overshadows its competitive economic 
base. 
Judging by the contemporary literature, the expansion of this power superstructure seems 
to have accelerated in recent decades. Mainstream economists nowadays are busy uncovering 
more and more ‘distortions’ and ‘imperfections’, such as rising market power,26 the undue ex-
pansion of intellectual property rights27 and excessive inequality,28 while many contemporary 
Marxists are shifting their focus from the ‘reality’ of labour and production to the ‘fiction’ of 
financialization.29 And as these unsettling discoveries multiply and the power superstructure 
continues to expand, the theoretical role of the idealized perfectly competitive base becomes 
unclear and its elementary particles of utils and SNALT – the basic building blocks that eve-
rything else is supposedly made of – dissipate. 
This dissipation may explain why so few mainstream economists mention, let alone em-
ploy, utils in their research, and why only a handful of Marxists study SNALT. But then, no 
science can ignore its own elementary particles and remain a science, at least not for long. So 
the writing is on the wall.  
 
6. So, in your view, mainstream and radical political economists have gotten themselves into 
a trap. How does CasP avoid this trap?  
 
Bichler & Nitzan. By inverting the top-heavy pyramid so that power, instead of hanging in 
the air, becomes the basis that everything else stands on and stems from. 
CasP sees power not as an ad hoc addition to the material base of production or an external 
distortion of the laissez fair economy, but as the very foundation of capitalism – and therefore 
views capitalism as a whole not as a mode of production and consumption, but as a mode of 
power. Capital in our approach is not a ‘real’ productive entity, but an ‘operational symbol’ of 
organized power at large.30 It is the totalizing power institution that defines and perpetuates 
capitalism to start with, the logic that tells capitalists what their interests are and then forces 
 
26 For example, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017, 2018) and Diez Leigh and Tambunlertchai (2018). 
27 Cardoza et al. (2006), Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006) and Kurtz (2017). 
28 Auto et al. (2017), Debla-Norris et al. (2015), Gans et al. (2019) and McKinsey & Company et al. (2016). 
29 For instance, Bryan, Rafferty and Wigan (2017), Epstein (2005), Foster (2007), Krippner (2005), Magdoff and 
Sweezy (1985), Mann (2010), Mavroudeas (2018), Roberts (2018) and Sweezy (1991, 1994). 
30 Ulf Martin (2019) differentiates between three types of symbols: (1) magical (the symbols and the ‘reality’ they 
symbolize are the same); (2) ontological (the symbols are distinct from the ‘reality’ they symbolize); and (3) opera-
tional (the symbols create/render the very ‘reality’ they symbolize). Capital, Martin argues, is an operational symbol: 
it creates and renders capitalism.  
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them to impose those interests on society. Capital, we posit, exerts its power not over ‘eco-
nomic’ groups and classes, but over the whole of humanity. Quantified as finance on the var-
ious asset markets, capital represents not economic means of production, raw materials, past 
labour or technical knowhow, but the multifaceted power of capitalists, operating against op-
position, to creorder – or create the order of – society as a whole.31 
And there is more. As noted, CasP rejects not only the real/nominal duality of the econ-
omy, but the very bifurcation of politics and economics. By distinguishing armies from corpo-
rations, elections from supply chains and geopolitics from foreign investment, conventional 
theories condition us to see the ‘economic’ base of accumulation as definitionally distinct from 
its ‘political’ superstructure. But from a CasP perspective they are inseparable. Accumulation, 
we argue, happens not in the productive realm of economics, but in the capitalized domain of 
power. By rejecting the dualities of the real/nominal and economics/politics, CasP allows the 
full spectrum of power to assume centre stage. Every aspect of institutionalized power – re-
gardless of its formal classification as ‘political’, ‘economic’, ‘cultural’, ‘international’ and so 
on – is a potential feature of capital. 
Note that this last claim has nothing to do with the postmodern plurality of ‘capitals’. 
Contrary to Hanifan, Becker and Bourdieu, capital does not come in different flavours.32 There 
is no such thing as ‘economic capital’ – just as there is no such thing as ‘social capital’, ‘cultural 
capital’, ‘natural capital’, ‘human capital’, ‘symbolic capital’, ‘academic capital’, ‘technologi-
cal capital’, ‘military capital’, ‘religious capital’, ‘spiritual capital’, ‘emotional capital’, ‘recre-
ational capital’ or ‘whatnot capital’. Like the Almighty, capital is a singular hierarchical total-
ity that embodies and reflects all of its earthly manifestations. There is one type of capital, and 
one type only: a unified operational symbol that constantly discounts and fuses different forms 
of power into a single capitalized entity. 
And this comprehensive, non-disciplinary reduction of multiple powers into a single entity 
means that, unlike conventional political economy, which nowadays tends to ignore its con-
ceptual building blocks of hedonic pleasure (utils) and productive labour (SNALT), every 
piece of CasP research is a study of power, by definition. 
Capitalist power – which includes every form of power that bears on accumulation – is 
manifested in and reduced to the quantity of capital. According to CasP, this quantity is fi-
nance and only finance. For capitalists – and therefore for everyone else, including us as the-
orists – capital appears as capitalization: the present value of risk-adjusted expected earnings.33 
Capitalization is the operational symbol of capitalism, the algorithmic ritual that constantly 
creorders and quantifies capitalist power writ large, and with it the entire capitalist mode of 
power. This creordered quantification is where the study of capital as power begins.  
 
  
 
31 The term creorder was introduced in Nitzan and Bichler (2009) to denote the paradoxical fusion of Zeno and 
Heraclitus – of being and becoming, state and process, stasis and dynamism.  
32 Hanifan (1916), Becker (1964) and Bourdieu (1984, 1986). 
33 For simplicity, we use ‘earnings’ and ‘profits’ interchangeably.  
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7. How does your notion that capital is ‘finance and only finance’ relate to the debate over 
‘varieties of capitalism’ and the financialization of their accumulation regimes? Have you 
sought to contribute to this debate, or to decentre it? Does your approach offer other means of 
comparing the diversity and the transformations of capitalism? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. There isn’t much overlap between the varieties-of-capitalism and financial-
ization literatures on the one hand and CasP on the other, and the main reason is that they 
ask totally different questions based on totally different frameworks. 
The varieties of capitalism literature, sparked by the work of Hall and Soskice, examines 
differences in the coordination of capitalist economies, including the relationship between cap-
ital, labour and the state, the pattern of corporate governance and the nature of corporate fi-
nance.34 Originally, this approach began by identifying the distinct features of two ideal types 
– liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME) – features that 
were then combined, in various dosages, to generate a whole spectrum of hybrid models. One 
of these features – the nature of corporate finance – was picked up by theorists of financializa-
tion, who claim, for various reasons, that capitalism is becoming increasingly ‘financial’ – 
namely, that financial markets, motives, institutions and elites are gaining prominence; that 
profit and accumulation increasingly rely on finance rather than on production and trade; and 
that financial returns, because they aren’t being ploughed back into the real economy, end up 
creating chronic stagnation.35 
Begin with the varieties literature. Capitalism can certainly organize somewhat differently 
in different contexts. Indeed, from a CasP perspective, it has to. Unlike in the varieties litera-
ture, where these differences are seen as aspects of coordination, in CasP they are viewed as 
features of capitalized power. And given that, as a dialectical relationship, capitalized power is 
always imposed against and indeed creates its own opposition, it must, almost by definition, 
develop with some permutations across different societies. 
But these differences must be put in historical context.36 Take the LME of the U.S., the 
CME of Germany and the emerging market of China. The differences between them are far 
smaller today that they were a century or even ten years ago, and they become insignificant 
when contrasted with those that existed two centuries ago. In many respects, capitalism en-
forces convergence. 
Much of this convergence is imposed by the ritual of capitalization. According to CasP, 
power that affects the level and pattern of earnings gets capitalized, and this capitalization 
occurs – and here is the key point – regardless of whether the society in question is labelled 
LME, CME or some in-between hybrid. Moreover, power gets capitalized into every type of 
asset – be it the privately held shares of unlisted firms such as Vitol, Huawei and Cargill, the 
equities of listed corporations like ICBC, Deutsche Bank and Apple, the debt of companies 
 
34 Hall and Soskice (2001). 
35 For precursors and more recent contributors, see Baran and Sweezy (1966), Magdoff and Sweezy (1983), Wil-
liams et al. (2000), Froud, Johal and Williams (2002), Krippner (2005), Epstein (2005), Foster (2007), Hudson 
(2010) and Dutta (2018). 
36 See Bichler and Nitzan (2010). 
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such as Volkswagen, AT&T and SoftBank and the assets of state-owned enterprises like Ar-
amco and Sinopec – as well as the holdings of various NGOs, legal and illegal alike. Finally, 
and equally if not more importantly, it gets capitalized into the debt of governments – i.e., into 
the capitalist ownership of the state’s power to tax, borrow and print money – and in that sense 
enforces convergence on governments as well.37 
Furthermore, and crucially, capitalized power – just like non-capitalized forms of orga-
nized power – tends to self-propagate. According to Ulf Martin, the very attempt by capitalists 
to ‘rationalize’ society through the capitalization of power generates resistance to this ration-
alization; this resistance, which from a capitalist viewpoint seems ‘irrational’, calls for more 
capitalization to reign in the newly emergent irrationality; this additional capitalization leads 
to more resistance and therefore further capitalization; and so on in a never-ending ‘autocata-
lytic sprawl’.38 And as this self-propagation crosses borders, it results in further convergence.39 
The autocatalytic sprawl of capitalization – i.e., the discounting to present value of more 
and more expected future income flows – is often described as ‘financialization’, though in our 
view that description is deeply misleading for at least two reasons. First, unlike financializa-
tion, capitalization is hardly new. As we shall see, it started not in the late, middle or even 
early twentieth century as theorists of financialization often suggest, but in the European burgs 
of the fourteenth century. Second, unlike capitalization, which is a universal, unambiguous 
algorithm abided, with great exactitude, by billions of followers, financialization is a vague, 
theoretically loaded concept that lacks a clear definition. 
Contemporary notions of financialization are closely related to theories of productivity, 
particularly Marx’s.40 When it comes to productivity, neoclassicists consider finance as pro-
ductive as any other economic activity (or more accurately, as productive as its income im-
plies). Not so with Marx. In his theory, accumulation unfolds through expanded reproduction, 
such that: 
 
3.   M C  P  P’  C’  M’ 
 
In this process, financial capital (money M), turns into commercial capital (commodities 
C), to be transformed into industrial capital (work in progress, or productive capital P), pro-
ducing more industrial capital (P’), converted again into commercial capital (more commodi-
ties C’) and finally into financial capital (more money M’). Although this expanded reproduc-
tion is a single process, during the nineteenth century each of its circuits appeared to be dom-
inated by a different group, or fraction of the capitalist class: the conversion M M’ was dom-
inated by the financial fraction, C  C’ by the commercial fraction and P  P’ by the industrial 
fraction. Of these, the industrial fraction was deemed productive: it was considered the engine 
 
37 For CasP analyses of debt in general and public debt in particular, see Di Muzio and Robbins (2015) and Hager 
(2016). 
38 Martin (2019). 
39 For instance, over the past several decades, many LMEs have seen the delisting-through-merger of many firms, 
while CMEs and emerging markets have witness a sharp rise in the listing of previously private firms. See for 
example Nitzan (1996) and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2017). 
40 The remainder of this section draws on Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 7 and pp. 253-262). 
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of accumulation, the site where value was determined and surplus value created. The financial 
and commercial circuits-fractions, by contrast, were seen as unproductive, deriving their profit 
through an intra-capitalist redistributional struggle. 
This theoretical framework continues to underpin much of heterodox political economy, 
including its non-Marxist branches, and it is the linchpin of the modern financialization liter-
ature: the M M’ circuit/fraction, goes the argument, grows ‘on account’ of the P  P’ (and 
some argue also the C  C’) one, and this relative expansion is said to undermine productivity 
growth, increase inequality and breed stagnation. 
In our view, the problem with this argument is threefold. The first is conceptual. For Marx 
accumulation is a ‘real’, backward-looking process denominated in dead labour. For capital-
ists, though, accumulation is a financial, forward-looking undertaking counted in discounted 
expected future earnings. From the latter’s viewpoint, all capital and all capitalists are financial 
by definition, capitalism was therefore financial from the word go, and the notion of ‘finan-
cialization’ as a historical progression is meaningless. 
The second problem is practical. The process of diversification – at the corporate level 
(where firms operate in many different sectors) and at the portfolio level (where individual 
capitalists own many different companies) – makes it difficult if not impossible to separate so-
called financial capital and capitalists from productive and commercial ones. 
The third problem is theoretical. As it stands, there is no objective way to identify ‘produc-
tive’ activity and therefore no easy way to delineate it from ‘unproductive’ finance (and com-
merce). According to Marx, productive activity is performed only by productive labour, but 
how do we know which labour is productive?41 Fine and Harris, for instance, state that, ‘If 
labour directly produces surplus value it is productive; if not, it is unproductive’ – but how can 
we identify surplus value when we see it? Alternatively, they suggest that ‘only labour which 
is performed under the control of capital (on the basis of the sale of labour-power from workers 
to capitalists), and in the sphere of production, is productive’ – but if our ultimate purpose is 
to identify the sphere of production, how can we pretend to know what constitutes this sphere 
before we have even started?42 
With these limitations in mind, some orthodox Marxists, such as Duménil and Lévy, 
throw in the towel, at least for the time being, admitting that there is no pratical way to 
delineate financial from non-financial activity, conceeding that the term ‘finance’ should be 
used to describe capitalist owners in general, and hoping that these Marxist distinctions can 
be validated at some future date.43  
We think they can’t be – not within conventional political economy, anyway. The 
challenge here has been well summarized by Paul Sweezy in his reflections on Monopoly 
Capital, a book he coauthored in 1966 with Paul Baran:44 
 
 
41 Recall our discussion of the never-ending modifications of the ‘production function’. 
42 Fine and Harris (1976: 56). 
43 Duménil and Lévy (2005: 21-22). 
44 Baran and Sweezy (1966). 
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Why did Monopoly Capital fail to anticipate the changes in the structure and 
functioning of the system that have taken place in the last twenty-five years? Basically, 
I think the answer is that its conceptualization of the capital accumulation process is one-sided 
and incomplete. In the established tradition of both mainstream and Marxian 
economics, we treated capital accumulation as being essentially a matter of adding to 
the stock of existing capital goods. But in reality this is only one aspect of the process. 
Accumulation is also a matter of adding to the stock of financial assets. The two 
aspects are of course interrelated, but the nature of this interrelation is problematic to 
say the least. The traditional way of handling the problem has been in effect to assume 
it away: for example, buying stocks and bonds (two of the simpler forms of financial 
assets) is assumed to be merely an indirect way of buying real capital goods. This is 
hardly ever true, and it can be totally misleading. This is not the place to try to point 
the way to a more satisfactory conceptualization of the capital accumulation process. 
It is at best an extremely complicated and difficult problem, and I am frank to say that 
I have no clues to its solution. But I can say with some confidence that achieving a 
better understanding of the monopoly capitalist society of today will be possible only 
on the basis of a more adequate theory of capital accumulation, with special emphasis 
on the interaction of its real and financial aspects, than we now possess.45 
 
Note that Sweezy correctly recognized that the problem lies in the very definition of capital 
– yet remained hostage to the very real/financial bifurcation that created this problem in the 
first place. And that’s where CasP comes in. To reiterate, capital – whether it appears as 
JPMorgan Chase equities, Airbus debt, or Cargill’s family holdings – is financial and only 
financial, irrespective of the economic activity it is formally associated with. Its capitalized 
quantity derives not from the underlying productivity of its owned artefacts (assuming that 
artefacts can have individual productivity to start with), but from the ability of its owners to 
leverage these artefacts, along with other institutions, processes and organizations, in exerting 
redistributional power. And it is this capitalized ability to exert power that underpins the di-
versity of capitalism and drives its historical development. 
 
8. So what exactly do you mean by capitalization? Can you explain it in some detail? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. As cogs in the capitalist megamachine and bearers of its larger logic, capi-
talists are conditioned to look forward into the deep future. They price, or ‘capitalize’, assets 
here and now by ‘discounting’ to ‘present value’ the earnings they expect these assets to yield 
all the way to eternity. Their discounting algorithm first emerged in the European burgs of the 
fourteenth century, or even earlier, and has since developed into a full-fledged ritual with com-
plex scriptures, a bloated financial clergy and billions of followers. The basic principle, though, 
is simple and can be expressed by a short formula. Equation 4 shows our own version of this 
 
45 Sweezy (1991: emphases added). 
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formula, with 𝐾 on the left denoting the asset’s capitalized value and the four elementary par-
ticles on the right representing its basic determinants:46 
 
4.   𝐾 =
𝜋 × 𝐻
𝛿 × 𝑛𝑟𝑟
 
 
Let’s look more closely at this expression. The expected future earnings being discounted 
are the product 𝜋 × 𝐻. The first item, 𝜋, measured in dollars, is the actual, ex post future earn-
ings flow (say per annum) that will become known as the future unfolds. The second item, 𝐻, 
is hype. Expressed as a decimal, it measures the excessive optimism/pessimism of investors 
here and now regarding those ex post earnings. For example, if the actual future earnings flow 
𝜋 will turn out to be $10 billion/year, and if investors here and now, being overly optimistic, 
expect those earnings to be $20 billion/year, then their hype 𝐻 is 2 (= $20𝑏𝑛 ÷ $10𝑏𝑛). 
The discount rate is the product 𝛿 ×  𝑛𝑟𝑟. The first component, 𝛿, is the risk factor that 
investors associate with the asset’s expected earnings. The second component, 𝑛𝑟𝑟, is the nor-
mal rate of return that investors think they deserve for riskless assets. For instance, if the nor-
mal rate of return is 5 per cent a year, or 0.05, and the risk associated with the particular asset 
in question is 2, the overall discount rate is 0.1 (= 0.05 × 2). 
Using this particular example, an asset with an ex post earnings flow 𝜋 = $10 billion/year, 
a hype factor 𝐻 = 2, a risk factor 𝛿 = 2 and a normal rate of return 𝑛𝑟𝑟 = 0.05 will be capital-
ized at $200 billion (= ($10𝑏𝑛 × 2) ÷ (2 × 0.05)). Over time, the magnitudes of these ele-
mentary particles change and so does the asset’s capitalization – which is exactly what we 
observe in the equity and debt markets. 
 
9. As it stands, the capitalization ‘ritual’, as you call it, seems rather technical. But you argue 
that this seemingly technical ritual is in fact all about power. Can you explain and illustrate 
how? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. The first to explicitly articulate the modern concept of force/power was 
probably Johannes Kepler.47 Until Kepler, force/power was a stand-alone qualitative entity on 
par with other basic elements such as matter and fire. Kepler redefined it as a quantitative rela-
tionship between entities – and according to CasP, that’s how capitalists – and therefore everyone 
else – view capitalization: as a quantitative relationship between entities.  
The capitalization of any given asset, we argue, never stands on its own. To be meaningful, 
it must be expressed relative to the capitalization of other entities. And since capitalism is 
about the accumulation of capital, its driving force must be understood relatively. The ultimate 
goal is not absolute accumulation, but differential accumulation. And to accumulate differen-
tially means to increase differential capitalization. 
Equation 5 shows the differential capitalization 𝐾𝐷  of an arbitrary entity – i.e., the ratio of 
the entity’s own capitalization to that of some benchmark.  
 
46 This particular formula assumes a fixed, perpetual flow of future earnings.  
47 Jammer (1957) and Koestler (1959). 
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5.   𝐾𝐷 =
𝜋𝐷 × 𝐻𝐷
𝛿𝐷
 
 
The entity in question can be a person, partnership, corporation, government, NGO, in-
ternational organization, religious group, terrorist organization, criminal gang or some group-
ing of one or more of these entities – and so can be the benchmark to which the entity is 
compared. For example, we can compute the differential capitalization of Jeff Bezos relative 
to Warren Buffet, Amazon relative to FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google), 
FANG relative to the S&P 500, Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global relative to the 
FTSE All-World Index, ISIS relative to Saudi Arabia, the Yamaguchi-gumi relative to the 
Yakuza as a whole, Kuwait Finance House relative to the S&P BSE 500 Shariah Index, etc.48 
According to CasP, the magnitude 𝐾𝐷  is a quantitative representation of power – the 
power of the entity’s owners relative to those who own the benchmark. Furthermore, and 
crucially, this representation is a linear, ‘one-to-one’ mapping. It is linear in the comparative sense 
that an entity with a 𝐾𝐷 = 𝑛 is n times more powerful than its benchmark. And it is linear in 
the temporal sense that an entity whose 𝐾𝐷 rises by m times is m times more powerful than it 
was. 
The linearity stems from the undiscriminating nature of capitalization. (1) Capitalization 
is owner independent – i.e., it is the same for all owners. Unlike in neoclassical political econ-
omy, where income is ultimately earmarked for hedonic pleasure and therefore (should be) 
discounted based on the owner’s individual utility, in CasP income is earned for its societal 
power and therefore discounted in the same way regardless of who owns it. (2) Capitalization 
is asset-type independent – in other words, it is the same for all types of assets. Since each capi-
talized dollar already accounts for future earnings, hype and risk, the social power it represents 
is the same regardless of the entity’s legal organization (private/governmental/NGO, 
listed/unlisted, industrial/commercial/financial, etc.) and regardless of the financial instru-
ments being used (equities, debt, commodities or cash). And (3) capitalization is asset-size inde-
pendent – namely, it is the same for big and small entities alike. For any given combination of 
hype and risk, the first dollar of an entity’s earnings is discounted in exactly the same way as 
its last, which means that small and large entities discount their earnings in much the same 
way. All in all, then, capitalization is totally ‘democratic’, in that every capitalized dollar rep-
resents the same quantum of power. 
The magnitude of 𝐾𝐷 – that is, the differential power of the entity’s owners – is determined 
by the elementary particles on the right-hand side of the Equation 5, which we derive from 
Equation 4, only that here we express them differentially, as a ratio to the corresponding mag-
nitudes of the benchmark (hence the subscript D). These particles comprise differential earn-
ings 𝜋𝐷, differential hype 𝐻𝐷 and differential risk 𝛿𝐷. Since the normal rate of return is the 
 
48 The differential habit of thinking has spread to all aspects of capitalism: nowadays, everything from the size of 
the army and the growth of GDP, to Internet presence and media ratings, to artistic and academic achievements 
seems driven not by ‘whose is big’ but ‘whose is bigger’. 
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same everywhere, the differential normal rate of return 𝑛𝑟𝑟𝐷 = 1 and therefore drops from the 
equation.49 
The quest for higher-differential-capitalization-𝐾𝐷-read-greater-power goes hand in hand 
with CasP’s notion of dominant capital – the largest, state-embedded corporate coalitions at the 
centre of the political economy.50 The differential accumulation of these coalitions both drives 
and reflects their struggles against lesser corporations and the rest of society, as well as the 
development of the capitalist mode of power more broadly and the conflictual evolution of its 
ruling class. 
This, of course, is not the received view. Theories of political economy, both liberal and 
Marxist, stipulate that capitalists large and small seek to maximize their absolute profit so as to 
achieve the highest possible net worth. But that’s not what we see around us. Capitalists now-
adays – and certainly the dominant ones – rarely if ever speak of, let alone care about, maxi-
mization (not least because nobody knows what that maximum might be). Instead, they are 
obsessed with relative performance, seeking to ‘beat the average’ and ‘exceed the normal rate 
of return’. Their goal is to have their capitalization grow faster than that of others – or, in our 
lingo, to accumulate differentially. And this is not some sort of psychological quirk or a habit-
ual affliction. Capitalists are conditioned and compelled to behave this way. Those who suc-
ceed become dominant, whereas those who don’t are quickly taken over or reduced to irrele-
vancy by those who do. 
In order to accumulate differentially, capitalists must increase the magnitude 
(𝜋𝐷 × 𝐻𝐷)/(𝛿𝐷 × 𝑛𝑟𝑟𝐷). This is what the ritual in Equation 5 dictates. And that increase – and 
here we come to our key point – depends on and represents power and nothing but power. 
To illustrate, take Apple Inc., and start with the first elementary particle: its differential 
future earnings 𝜋𝐷 relative to some broad benchmark – say the S&P 500. In order to increase 
𝜋𝐷, Apple will need to operate on many fronts. Working with and against others, it will need 
to affect domestic and foreign legislation, policies, subsidies and taxes in ways that will favour 
its own earnings relative to those of the S&P 500; restrict wages, input prices, borrowing rates 
and other costs while inflating its selling prices relative to those of the S&P 500; protect its 
own intellectual and other property rights while violating those of others, including those of 
other S&P 500 firms; threaten governments with ‘relocation’ to increase its differential tax 
breaks; influence local conflicts and international relations in ways that advance its own earn-
ings over those of the S&P 500; shape school curricula to boost the high-tech workforce; con-
dition consumers, both private and governmental, to increase the purchase of Apple products 
and services relative to the S&P 500; the list goes on. And Apple is hardly unique. A similar 
list of differential tasks can be drawn for any other capitalized entity – and in all cases, we 
argue, achieving these tasks depends entirely on power. 
In this connection, it is important to note another CasP point, namely that raising one’s 
differential earnings – and differential capitalization more generally – is a double-sided process. 
 
49 Occasionally, limits on the vendibility/movement of capital generate different normal rates of return in different 
situations and jurisdictions, resulting in 𝑛𝑟𝑟𝐷 ≠ 1. We ignore these cases here.  
50 The concept of dominant capital is explained in Nitzan and Bichler (2002, 2009). 
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An entity like Apple can achieve it by increasing its own earnings faster than those of its bench-
mark (in this case, the S&P 500). But it can also do so by making the benchmark’s earnings fall 
more rapidly or rise more slowly than its own. 
This double-sidedness is highly important – and totally ignored by political economists. 
As noted, liberals and Marxists both focus on absolute gain (the maximization of profit or net 
worth) – and therefore concentrate only on what accumulators can do to improve their own 
situation. But with differential gain, reducing or restricting the gains of others can have the 
same effect. Of course, individual entities – even as large as Apple – might find it difficult to 
affect their benchmark, particularly if it represents a much larger grouping such as the 
S&P 500. But that is no longer the case for dominant capital coalitions and large alliances. 
Our analysis of Middle East Energy Conflicts, for example, has shown how the Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition of large armament and oil firms leveraged regional wars to boost its own 
earnings while lowering those of the Fortune 500.51 Similar two-prong processes affected the 
differential earnings of Israel’s leading conglomerates,52 South Korea’s key Chaebols,53 and 
the world’s largest agricultural commodity traders.54 
The two-pronged path to differential earnings highlights the crucial importance of what 
Veblen called strategic sabotage.55 It demonstrates our contention that, contrary to received 
convention, accumulation is not synonymous with growth. It is true that increasing one’s own 
earnings can sometimes happen in the context of rising production and employment; but, ac-
cording to CasP, undermining the earnings of others always implies some measure of restriction 
and stagnation. And this last point is cardinal: as the logic of differential accumulation takes 
over and capitalized entities grow in size and importance, undermining others become imper-
ative, strategic sabotage takes over, overall growth decelerates and ‘accumulating through cri-
sis’ (our term) slowly becomes the norm. 
So far, we have focused only on differential earnings. But the same arguments apply to the 
other elementary particles of differential accumulation – namely, differential hype and differ-
ential risk.56 In the late 1990s, for instance, high-tech capitalists were able to increase their 
differential hype 𝐻𝐷, with the resulting dot-com boom causing their differential capitalization 
relative to the societal average to grow exponentially – a strategy that has been used to enrich 
numerous capitalist groups ever since the early ‘manias’ of the Mississippi and South Sea Bub-
bles. The key point here is that the effect of manipulating hype has nothing to do with produc-
tion. It is an organized act of deception, pure and simple, and organized deception depends 
wholly and only on the manipulators’ power. 
Similarly with differential risk 𝛿𝐷. Take the early British colonial expansion into South 
Africa led by the likes of Cecil Rhodes and Nathan Rothschild.57 The initial benefit for the 
colonial investors came from rising differential earnings, but also – and often more so – from 
 
51 For instance, Nitzan and Bichler (1995), Nitzan and Bichler (1996b) and Bichler and Nitzan (2015b). 
52 Nitzan and Bichler (2002). 
53 Park (2016). 
54 Baines (2017). 
55 Veblen (1904, 1923). A refinement of Veblen’s concept is offered in Bichler and Nitzan (2017b: fn. 3, pp. 3-4). 
56 See Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Cf. Part III). 
57 For a differential CasP analysis of South Africa’s diamond business, see Cochrane (2015, 2016). 
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falling differential risk. As the South African natives were subjugated, ownership was ration-
alized and centralized and greater stability was imposed, the risk coefficient dropped and the 
imperialists’ differential capitalization rose accordingly. Here too, the process had little to do 
with production and everything to do with power. And this power path to differential accu-
mulation not only remains in use today, but is traversed with much greater vigor. Take Holly-
wood. Over the past half-century, its net profits have merely met the average, yet its differential 
capitalization has risen continuously. And the reason, just like with Rhodes and Rothschild, 
is risk reduction. The leading film companies have learned how to substitute blockbuster pre-
dictability for artistic creativity, and as their strategic sabotage has intensified and their movies 
have grown duller, their differential risk has declined and differential capitalization has 
trended upward.58 
So capital is quantified power throughout: a differential magnitude whose elementary par-
ticles – differential earnings, hype and risk – are manifestations of power and nothing but 
power. The process of capitalizing power is simple and abiding: owners of assets actively cre-
order and leverage power to increase or decrease the elementary particles of their capital as 
the case may be; every power aspect of society that affects those particles gets capitalized; and 
once capitalized, that aspect of power becomes an integral part of their capital. 
And that, mind you, is how it was from the very beginning of capitalization in the burgs 
of Medieval Europe.59 In our view, capitalist finance – and capitalism more generally – was 
born as an attempt to bypass feudal power. Bills of exchange, letters of credit and maritime 
insurance, along with the proto-corporate commenda and compagnia, were invented partly as 
means to transcend feudal territoriality. From there, finance diversified into ‘real estate’ – the 
traditional seat of feudal power – with mortgages and mortgage banks gradually wrestling 
control away from the landed aristocracy. It also branched out into war finance, with the Lom-
bardian city states issuing future tax-backed bonds whose current proceeds paid for the soldiers 
and weapons with which they waged increasingly successful campaigns against barter-backed 
knights. The territorial princes and kings, initially hostile to the latter arrangement, found the 
temptation of fight-now-pay-later irresistible. Eventually, they began to borrow the methods 
and money of the bourgeoisie, with the result being a growing interdependency – and eventu-
ally a bondage – between the territorial sovereign and the exterritorial capitalists. In due 
course, this alliance would develop into a new mode of power, a social space we now call the 
‘capitalist nation-state’. 
And it is in this context that we see the first systematic, forward-looking capitalization of 
power: the ‘government bond’. Monarchs and princes, needing cash to finance their increas-
ingly expensive military campaigns, found themselves forced into issuing discounted notes to 
lending capitalists. The notes, backed by expected future taxes and war booty, represented 
‘shares’ in the organized violence of society. They capitalized the violent power of the feudal 
state and in so doing inseminated a new one – the state of capital. Marx famously stated that 
‘Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself economic 
 
58 McMahon (2013, 2015, 2018). 
59 Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 13). 
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power’.60 In our opinion, though, this statement is far too restrictive and ultimately misleading: 
force and power more generally are the hallmark of every mode of power, old and new – and 
indeed, they today permeate capitalism no less, and possibly much more, than they did when 
it first emerged. 
The differential reduction of power into capital resembles a Fourier Transform. Mathe-
matically, any arbitrary shape can be Fourier transformed into a series of trigonometric func-
tions with different frequencies – and vice versa.61 Differential capitalization works in a similar 
way. It takes the qualitatively different relations of power that constitute a given capitalized 
entity and combines them into a single, universal magnitude: a pure number representing the 
entity’s differential capitalization vis-à-vis its benchmark. 
Conventional political economy is totally impervious to this Fourier-like transformation. 
It does recognize power, but only as an external force that distorts or assists the productive-
utilitarian essence of capital. Power that does not bear on this productive-utilitarian entity – 
even if it has a major impact on capitalization – is considered irrelevant for ‘real’ accumula-
tion. And this antiquated view of reality, we argue, leads to a dead end. Since util- and 
SNALT-denominated capital is a totally fictitious entity, political economists end up uphold-
ing an unworkable theory that seeks to explain a real economic entity that is not only imperti-
nent to real capitalists, but doesn’t even exist. 
 
10. Let’s pick up on this last point. If capital in general and differential accumulation in par-
ticular are about power and only power, where does this leave the process of production (la-
bour) and the pursuit of individual wellbeing (utility)? Are production and wellbeing irrelevant 
for differential accumulation? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Production and wellbeing are very relevant for capital and differential ac-
cumulation – but only under the control and direction of power and in ways that are not nec-
essarily the ones you’d expect. According to CasP, what matters for accumulation is not the 
processes of production and wellbeing as such, but control over those processes. It is not the 
flows of output and consumption that count, but the manner in which these flows are shaped, 
restricted and sabotaged to affect differential earnings, hype and risk.  
Before unzipping this power dimension, we should reiterate that, despite their claims to 
the contrary, liberals and Marxists in fact fail to explain accumulation with either wellbeing or 
production. We have already seen that neither liberals nor Marxists have a universal unit with 
which to quantify wellbeing, production and capital, and that power wreaks havoc with the 
automaticity of both their models. And then there is a third point that we haven’t yet men-
tioned, and that is that neither group has a scientific theory of profit. This latter failure is par-
ticularly biting, since the ‘flow’ of profit, when ploughed back into production, is what causes 
the ‘stock’ of capital to accumulate – or at least that’s what we are told. 
 
60 Marx (1909: 824). 
61 You don’t have to be a mathematician to enjoy the beautifully animated Fourier transformations of Ptolemy’s 
epicycles and Homer Simpson’s face (Mathbloger 2018; Serra and Carman 2008). 
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On paper, the explanations look elegant: liberals say that profit is proportionate to the 
(marginal) productivity of capital, whereas Marxists claim it’s equal to the difference between 
the total value of output and the total value of labour power required to produce that output.62 
In practice, though neither is able to measure these determinants independently of prices, and 
therefore neither can claim to explain accumulation with either wellbeing or production. 
The root problem here is that both theories continue to mistake capital for a produc-
tive/economic entity. The error originated with the first political economists – although at 
least they had a good excuse.63 The nascent rule of capital revolutionized the ‘forces’ and ‘re-
lations’ of production, as Marx called them, so it seemed self-evident that value was rooted in 
the ‘economy’ and that the accumulation of capital was synonymous with the ongoing growth 
of its material inputs and outputs. 
However, this framework was built on quicksand. Capital, even at its very beginning, was 
never a material entity, but finance and only finance. It was not machines, structures, raw 
materials and technical knowhow, but a symbolic institution, denominated in money, to con-
trol society at large. It is true that, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before it started 
spreading into every other aspects of society, capitalist control concentrated mostly on the 
flows of production and consumption. But what got capitalized, even back then, was control 
over these flows, not the flows themselves. 
In and of itself, capital was a monetary magnitude from its very inception in the late Mid-
dle Ages, a capitalized legal claim denominated in prices. The money value of this claim was 
always forward-looking. It depended and continues to depend on the asset’s expected future 
profit and the discount rate that capitalists deem fitting for that future, and this forward-look-
ing monetary quantum – and here is the key point for our purpose here – has no direct connec-
tion to the ‘ploughing back’ of past profit. Past profits – and past production more generally – 
can certainly boost capitalization, but only if they increase expected future earnings and/or 
reduce the discount rate. And this increase/reduction is always controlled and directed by 
power.  
 
11. Can you flesh out these claims with concrete examples? Why must the effect of production 
and wellbeing on accumulation be controlled and directed by power? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. According to the materialist view, the key to accumulation is making more 
and better goods and services – where better products (i.e. wellbeing) help fuel demand and 
greater output (production) enables supply. Although these two moments are conceptually 
distinct, for our purpose here they can be considered jointly by looking at the ‘volume’ – i.e., 
the number of units – produced and sold.  
 
62 Historically, liberal profits were justified on three different grounds – as a pay-out for abstinence/waiting, as 
compensation for the investor’s risk and as a return for the productivity of the capital stock itself. Eventually, the 
third justification proved the most effective, pushing the other two to the ideological background, from where they 
are occasionally retrieved as backup ammunition. 
63 For more on this issue, see Bichler, Nitzan and Di Muzio (2012: 7-15).  
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The impact of volume on differential capitalization works through its effect on the three 
elementary particles in Equation 5: differential future earnings 𝜋𝐷, differential hype 𝐻𝐷, and 
differential risk 𝛿𝐷. So, let’s examine each in turn, beginning with differential future earnings. 
Equation 6 shows the determinants of these earnings. It uses the subscript 𝐷 for the differ-
ential operator, 𝑄 for the volume to be produced and sold, 𝑃 for the unit price it will be sold 
at, and 𝑘 for the share of capitalists in the overall money value it will fetch (the markup): 
 
6.   𝜋𝐷 = 𝑄𝐷 × 𝑃𝐷 × 𝑘𝐷 
 
To illustrate this determination, we go back to Apple Inc. with the S&P 500 as its bench-
mark. According to Equation 6, the company can increase its differential future profit 𝜋𝐷 by 
increasing one or more of the following: (1) 𝑄𝐷 to raise its volume faster than the S&P 500; (2) 
𝑃𝐷 to raise its unit price faster than the S&P 500; and (3) 𝑘𝐷 to raise its markup faster than the 
S&P 500.64 
Now, assume that Apple follows the first path, increasing its volume faster than the S&P 
500. Based on Equation 6, and supposing everything else remains the same, its differential 
future profit will rise. In other words, the materialist view seems correct: even in a differential 
context, production and wellbeing do have a positive effect on profit and therefore accumulation. 
Or do they? 
The thing is that output as such does not generate profit. For output to generate profit, it 
must be sold at a positive price and a positive markup.65 And for prices and markups to be 
positive they must be backed by power.66 Of course, the magnitudes of price and the markup 
are intimately related to production – but this connection is usually not positive but negative, 
and this negativity, again, has everything to do with power. 
When Apple raises it differential volume, the other elements on the right-hand side of 
Equation 6 are unlikely to remain the same. At some point, the company’s differential price 
𝑃𝐷 and/or differential markup 𝑘𝐷 will begin to fall, and if the increase in 𝑄𝐷 is large enough, 
the combined drop in 𝑃𝐷 and 𝑘𝐷 is bound to become even larger. Eventually, a higher differ-
ential volume, instead of raising Apples’ differential profit and accumulation, will cause them 
to decline. 
Note that these dynamics have nothing do with ‘excess supply’ or ‘deficient demand’. 
These latter concepts are meaningful only in the imaginary neoclassical world, competitive or 
otherwise, where the autonomous desires of rational sellers and buyers rule the day. In the real 
world of capitalized power, the negative reactions of 𝑃𝐷 and 𝑘𝐷 to a runaway increase in 𝑄𝐷 
represent not a mismatch of desires, but the accumulator’s loss of control. In this case, they 
reflect Apple’s inability to maintain its differential power in the face of runaway output – which 
 
64 The same effects can be achieved by reducing these three magnitudes more slowly that the S&P 500. For sim-
plicity, we ignore here the possibility of Apple affecting these magnitudes for the S&P 500. 
65 A stark illustration: the global differential profits of the oil companies are tightly correlated with the relative price 
of oil (compared to the CPI); they show virtually no correlation to the volume of oil produced and sold (Bichler 
and Nitzan 2017a: Figure 2, p. 3). 
66 To see that this is indeed the case, just imagine what would happen to prices and markups in a world without 
property rights and the force to back them up. 
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is precisely why ‘such a free run of production has not been had nor aimed at; nor is it at all 
expedient, as a business proposition, that anything of the kind should be allowed’.67 Profits are 
inconceivable without production, but they are also impossible under a ‘free run’ of produc-
tion.68 
And these power interactions are by no means limited to Apple. They apply not only to 
high-tech products, but to the entire gamut of goods and services – from raw materials and 
food, to automobiles and houses, to weapon systems, financial services and electronic adver-
tising. Beyond a certain point, the free run of production and wellbeing causes power to disin-
tegrate and the relationship between differential volume on the one hand and differential profit 
and accumulation on the other to become negative.69 
The only way to avoid this negative impact – and perhaps even make it positive – is to 
leverage power. For instance, while raising its differential volume 𝑄𝐷, Apple can also increase 
its differential markup by incorporating in Ireland to reduce its differential taxes, bribing Chi-
nese government officials to lower its labour costs, preventing its U.S. workers from unioniz-
ing and putting pressure on its global suppliers to get their components for even less. It can 
also increase its differential price 𝑃𝐷 by persuading consumers that its new iPhone is much 
‘better’ and convincing governments and other organizational clients that its big-data tranches 
are ‘worth’ more. In both cases, the final effect of production and wellbeing on profit and 
accumulation will look positive – but only because this effect has been regulated and directed 
by the power underpinnings of a higher differential price and a bigger differential markup. 
And that’s hardly the end of the story. As noted, production affects not only differential 
profit 𝜋𝐷, but also differential hype 𝐻𝐷 and differential risk 𝛿𝐷. Thus, when announcing its 
plan to increase production, Apple must also persuade investors that this increase won’t un-
dermine – and might even raise – differential profit (so as to keep 𝐻𝐷 intact or boost it further) 
and that it won’t increase – and might even lower – differential risk (so as to keep or reduce 
𝛿𝐷). If the company fails in either or both tasks, the increase in differential profit might be 
more than offset by the combined drop in differential hype/risk, causing differential capitali-
zation to decline. And since both hype and risk are determined by power and only by power, 
we again see that production and wellbeing can increase accumulation only when backed by 
power.  
 
  
 
67 Veblen (1923: 373). 
68 This narrative also serves to highlight why Marx’s value-based notion of ‘exploitation’, even if problem-free, 
cannot capture the full spectrum of capitalized power. As a pecuniary magnitude, exploitation is always mediated 
through nominal prices and the markup and is therefore affected by forms of power that exist outside the labour 
process as such. 
69 Nitzan and Bichler (2000a: Figures 5.1 and 5.2, pp. 79-80) generalize these claims to the overall distribution of 
income, showing for the United States that, from a certain point onward, the income share of capital correlates 
negatively with the utilization of society’s resources: the higher the utilization, the lower the capitalist share of in-
come. See also the animation by Thouvenot (2019). 
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12. We know that market capitalization deviates from the dollar value of capital goods, which, 
at least on paper, is consistent with your claim that capital is not a material-productive entity 
but a financial representation of power. But couldn’t this deviation be the result of other, more 
mundane factors, such as the mismeasurement of intangible assets or the irrationality of inves-
tors? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. It could be, but it isn’t. 
Start with intangible assets. Many experts nowadays argue that because capitalization re-
flects tangible as well as intangible assets (essentially claims on proprietary knowledge and 
‘goodwill’), and since the ‘capital stock’ usually includes only the former type of assets, the 
dollar ratio between capitalization and the replacement cost of the capital stock – the so-called 
Tobin’s Q – is likely to differ from 1. And the experts further argue that, with the high-tech 
and information revolutions in full swing, we should expect intangible assets to grow faster 
than tangible ones, causing Tobin’s Q to trend upward – which is exactly what we have wit-
nessed in recent decades. 
The problem with this argument is twofold. First, intangible assets are like dark matter. 
They are invisible. The only way to see them is indirectly, by assuming they are equal to the 
‘residual’ left from subtracting the cost of tangible assets from total market value.70 And then 
there is the second issue: this residual fluctuates heavily, and this fluctuation makes no sense. 
Since intangible assets are said to represent productive knowledge, and since productive 
knowledge is usually cumulative, we should expect the magnitude of these assets to grow grad-
ually and more or less continuously. But that’s not what Tobin’s Q tells us. Instead, it shows 
that the size of intangibles rises as well as contracts – often by a lot – and this seesaw movement 
is highly suspect, for how could cumulative knowledge suddenly dissipate for no apparent 
reason, only to recover big time a few years later, again for no good reason? 
Although political economists rarely if ever raise the latter question, they do have a ready-
made answer: irrationality. The fluctuations of intangible assets, and consequently of Tobin’s 
Q, they posit, are due to investors’ incomplete foresight, emotional overreaction and pure de-
lusions, as well as to various market imperfections from government intervention to misinfor-
mation. 
The consequence of this irrationality, goes the argument, is financial bubbles and crises. 
During good times, with profits soaring and the ‘real’ capital stock rising, euphoric investors 
bid up financial markets to a bubbling frenzy, causing the intangible-asset ‘residual’ to appear 
much bigger than it truly is, or so goes the argument. During bad times, the process reverses. 
As real accumulation slows, financial markets decelerate even faster. And as the bubble bursts 
and the ‘residual’ deflates, we get the impression that intangible assets have contracted. 
The good news, though, is that investors’ irrationality and market imperfections, although 
annoying and inefficient, are safely bounded. They tend to move together with and thus merely 
amplify the ups and downs of ‘real’ accumulation. And although this amplification can be a 
 
70 This residual should not be confused with that of the production function, where the proportion of output that 
can’t be explained by physical inputs is labelled a ‘measure of our ignorance’ and ceremonially assigned to an 
invisible input called ‘technology’.  
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big headache in practice, it doesn’t undermine the theoretical primacy of the ‘real’ capital 
stock. 
Or doesn’t it? Because in reality, the relationship between market capitalization and the 
so-called real capital stock is exactly the opposite of what this common description would have 
us believe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Capital Accumulation: Fiction versus Reality 
 
NOTES: The market value of equities and bonds is net of foreign holdings by U.S. residents. Series are shown as 
10-year trailing averages. The last data points are 2018 for the current cost of corporate fixed assets and 2019 for 
the market value of corporate equities and bonds. SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global 
Insight (series codes: FAPNREZ for current cost of corporate fixed assets). The market value of corporate equities 
& bonds splices series from the following two sources. 1932-1951: Global Financial Data (market value of corporate 
stocks and market value of bonds on the NYSE). 1952-2019: Federal Reserve Board through Global Insight (series 
codes: FL893064105 for market value of corporate equities; FL263164100 for market value of foreign equities held 
by U.S. residents, including ADRs; FL893163005 for market value of corporate and foreign bonds; and 
FL263163005 for market value of foreign bonds held by U.S. residents).  
 
 
The two series in Figure 1 show the situation in the United States. Both series represent 
annual rates of change smoothed as 10-year trailing averages – one for the dollar replacement 
cost of fixed assets (thick black line), the other for the dollar market value of corporate stocks 
and bonds (thin red line). And as the data show, the market-value series does not amplify fixed 
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assets, or even go in the same direction. Instead, it moves in the opposite direction (with a 
negative Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.32). And this opposite movement cannot be dis-
missed as short-term noise. Its cycle has a peak-to-peak duration of 15-40 years, and it is highly 
patterned.  
And this pattern should be deeply unsettling. 
The promise of classical political economy, and later of economics, was to explain and 
justify the rule of capital: to show how capitalists, obsessed with increasing their own capital-
ization, propel the rest of society forward. In order to accumulate capital values in dollars and 
cents, goes the argument, capitalists must invest in ‘real’ means of production; and when they 
do so, they boost production, employment, knowledge, rationality, efficiency and the laissez 
faire regime as a whole. According to Figure 1, though, the reality, at least in the United States, 
is the very opposite: the growth rates of capitalization and ‘real capital’ move not together but 
inversely, which means that the interests of the capitalist rulers do not line up with society’s 
but are pitted against them. So even at this most basic level we are talking about power: the 
power of capitalists over – and contra – everyone else. And if that is indeed the case, who needs 
the capitalists, let alone the economists who legitimate them? 
So political economists must make a choice. They can either focus on what drives capital-
ists, which means treating capital as finance and only finance and theorizing the power pro-
cesses that drive capitalization – or they can stick with their ‘real’ capital and give up on being 
able say anything meaningful on the capitalist role of capitalists. But they cannot choose 
both.71  
 
13. Your emphasis on capitalization is influenced by Veblen, as is your analysis of business 
and industry and the notion that accumulation hinges not on productivity but on strategic 
sabotage, among other ideas. However, you distance yourselves from Veblenian institutional-
ism. Why? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Veblen broke new ground in multiple areas. He decimated neoclassical 
economics, offered a totally contrarian understanding of why business was antithetical to in-
dustry, and used this understanding to theorize the joint emergence and operation of big busi-
ness and the large state, capitalization and the ‘larger use of credit’. As young students in the 
early 1980s, we were impressed by his insights and originality – as well as by the ability of 
most political economists to totally ignore him.  
But although influenced by Veblen, we don’t see CasP as a Veblenian theory, let alone an 
institutionalist one.72 Unlike the old institutionalism of Veblen and others, CasP is dialectical 
 
71 The argument in this section, including Figure 1 and the challenge it presents to political economists, was first 
made in Bichler and Nitzan (2009) and Nitzan and Bichler (2009) and has been updated since in several of our 
publications, including a Real-World Economics Review article (Bichler and Nitzan 2015a). Based on access statistics 
from our own website as well as RWER’s, these three publications were downloaded at least 50,000 times (and 
possibly more, if we count reposting sites), so this argument was read by many. We find it telling that not a single 
reader, heterodox or orthodox, has bothered to engage with it. 
72 For more on the differences between CasP and Veblen’s work, see Bichler and Nitzan (2019). 
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rather than evolutionary, and in contrast to the new institutionalism, it seeks to critique and 
move away from capitalism rather than support and bolster it. 
Also, and more concretely, the central CasP concept of differential accumulation has no 
lineage – and in some sense is alien – to Veblen’s framework. Veblen, who wrote at the turn 
of the twentieth century, before the appearance of business indices and financial benchmarks, 
emphasized the absolute quest for ‘maximum profit’ and saw strategic sabotage merely as a 
power means to an economic end. By contrast, CasP, which developed at the end of the twen-
tieth century, sees power not only as a means of accumulation, but also – and perhaps more 
importantly – as its ultimate purpose. Accumulators, it argues, are conditioned and driven to 
augment not their profits and assets as such, but their relative power, and this means that, as 
symbolic bearers of power, these profits and assets should be measured not absolutely, but 
differentially, relatively to those of others. 
Let’s look at this latter difference more closely. Veblen uses ‘strategic sabotage’ inter-
changeably with the concept of ‘differential advantage’. Despite their linguistic similarity, the 
latter concept has no connection to our own notion of differential accumulation. Veblen’s pur-
pose – and this is the paramount point here – is to explain not differential profit, but profit as 
such. For him, differential advantage is simply the ability of capitalists to raise prices – abso-
lutely or relative to cost – so as to generate a profit in the first place. And what he seeks to 
show throughout his work is that, contrary to received convention, higher-prices-read-profits 
come not from the owners’ economic contribution to the community, but from their power to 
sabotage the community.73 
The question of whether the profit afforded by differential advantage beats, trails or equals 
the average profit is entirely irrelevant to and never raised in Veblen’s argument. Indeed, to the 
best of our knowledge, he makes no reference to the ‘normal rate of return’, ‘benchmarking’ 
or ‘beating the average’, and thus no mention, let alone analysis, of differential accumulation. 
And the reason is simple. For Veblen, power is a means of accumulation, and that’s it. By 
contrast, in CasP power is both the means and end of accumulation. In developing this double-
sided view of power and accumulation, we were inspired not by Veblen, but by Lewis Mum-
ford’s theory and history of the megamachine. In his two-volume The Myth of the Machine, 
which we mentioned earlier, Mumford examines the ancient and modern state incarnations 
of the megamachine, a mechanized social construct erected and maintained by state rulers as 
a way to exert power for the sake of power.74 Building on his insights, we have extended and 
developed this concept to the study of capitalism, arguing that capital is a modern megama-
chine and that accumulation is the capitalist form of augmenting power for its own sake.75 
This double-sided understanding of capital as power – the notion that power is both the 
principal tool and ultimate goal of accumulation – alters the meaning of capitalism. Whereas 
for Veblen (as well as for liberals and Marxists) the final purpose of accumulation is to increase 
one’s absolute claim, in CasP it is to raise one’s differential claim. And while for Veblen (and 
 
73 For instance, Veblen (1908: 108). 
74 Mumford (1967, 1970). 
75 Nitzan and Bichler (2002: Ch. 2; 2009: Ch. 13). 
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other political economists) the absolute claim is over output, in CasP the differential claim is 
over the societal process of reproducing the output as well as capitalism at large. 
The reason why Veblen never discussed differential accumulation is that, in his opinion, 
the end goal of all business undertakings is profit maximization – or in his words, the ‘largest net 
gain in terms of money’.76 And since maximization is antithetical to the very logic of differen-
tial accumulation, by insisting on the former Veblen effectively (albeit unknowingly) rejected 
the later. Although his texts are replete with references to ‘differentials’, his economic thinking 
was clearly absolute. In this respect, he remained fully aligned with the very neoclassicists he 
so effectively debunked. 
Finally, there is the issue of history. Veblen wrote in the early twentieth century and died 
in 1929. At the time, he was in no position to invent the concept of differential accumulation, 
let alone develop it into a full-fledged theory. The necessary historical conditions for such an 
articulation emerged only after his death. 
Consider the following facts: although the ritual of capitalization dates back to the late 
Middle Ages, economists started to examine it in earnest only at the turn of the twentieth 
century; the scientific study of finance commenced only with the Cowles Commission after 
the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression; portfolio theory emerged only in the 1950s; and 
it was only in the 1960s and 1970s that discounting became a central preoccupation of corpo-
rate finance. In other words, the key theoretical tools for examining differential accumulation 
were simply not there during Veblen’s lifetime. 
And the same goes for the data. Estimates of the national income and product accounts 
(NIPA) – including profit – were sanctioned only in 1932 and were first published only in the 
late 1940s. Similarly, the time series on corporate balance sheets and income statements pub-
lished by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) only go back to 1926. Until these statistics 
became available, there was no clear notion of average incomes, average profits or average 
assets. And the same is true of financial market indices. The Dow Jones Index began in the 
late nineteenth century, but until the emergence of industry-, sector- and size-based indices in 
the second half of the twentieth century, there were no relevant benchmarks to beat. 
In other words, during Veblen’s time there was no clear ‘average’ or ‘normal’ for individual 
investors and corporate organizations to refer to, and no obvious mechanism to assess, let 
alone achieve, differential accumulation. This vacuum is evident in Graham and Dodd’s Se-
curity Analysis – arguably the most famous finance textbook of the time (and some say of all 
time).77 The book, published five years after Veblen’s death, contains no mention of the terms 
‘benchmark’, ‘benchmarking’, ‘normal rate of return’, ‘average rate of return’ or ‘average re-
turns’. The phrase ‘beating the stock market’ appears twice, on the same page – but the discus-
sion relates not to differential accumulation, but to the difficulty of ‘buying low and selling 
high’. The term ‘index’ appears 12 times – but merely as a generic synonym for ‘proxy’ and 
‘measure’. The word ‘differential’ appears once – but only to denote a yield difference on a 
 
76 This maximization claim is repeated at least 16 time in Veblen (1904, 1923). For the actual references, see Bichler 
and Nitzan (2019). 
77 Graham and Dodd (1934). 
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bond issue of a particular company. ‘Dow Jones’ appears seven times – but merely in a de-
scriptive context and never in relation to differential performance. ‘Poor’s’ (the predecessor to 
Standard and Poor’s) is mentioned 14 times – twice to explain the nature of Poor’s Manuals 
and 12 times as references to specific company data. In this context, it is clear that Veblen 
simply did not have the necessary raw materials – conceptual or empirical – to think of accu-
mulation in differential terms, let alone come up with the concept of differential accumulation 
as such. 
 
14. In you work, you often refer to Michal Kalecki as a significant influence. Can you explain 
this influence, as well as how your approach might differ from his?  
 
Bichler & Nitzan. As students, we were impressed and inspired by Kalecki’s theoretical orig-
inality, empirical science and concise, no-frills writing style. We found it particularly appealing 
that he not only anticipated much of Keynes’ General Theory, but also fused it with a totally 
different ‘micro’ structure – a structure based not on competition, but on oligopolistic power. 
Kalecki’s most famous concept – the ‘degree of monopoly’ – was a revelation. And the 
novelty, at least in our view, was that he not only connected the power underpinnings of the 
microeconomy with its overall macro performance, but also offered what we thought was a 
very different way of measuring power to start with. Most political economists, even today, 
associate power with its visible ‘levers’, such as industry and aggregate concentration ratios, 
or direct political intervention. Kalecki did the opposite. He looked at power – in his case, the 
power of capitalists – not through its instruments, but through its consequences. The degree of 
monopoly, he argued, should be gauged not by the number of actors, their policies and actions, 
but by its distributional result – namely, by the capitalist share of income, or the markup. As 
an economist, Kalecki focused on economic power, but the principle was general. Our own 
notion that differential capitalization represents the power of its owners is partly inspired by 
his innovative index. 
Another related influence is the way in which Kalecki integrated the ruling class – partic-
ularly its inner struggles and conflicts – into his macroeconomic and geopolitical analyses. 
‘Many far-reaching upheavals in human history’, he pointed out, ‘started from a cleavage at 
the top of the ruling class’.78 This reminder that the intra-ruling class struggle could often be as 
important if not more important than the inter-class one, underpins our notion of differential 
accumulation and is written all over our work.  
But there is one important area where we differ sharply. For Kalecki, as for Veblen, accu-
mulation is an absolute process of amassing more and more claims on real assets. In this con-
text, power, however important, is a means to an end, not the end itself. And this assumption 
leads to conclusions that are opposite to ours. For instance, in his paper ‘Political Aspects of 
Full Employment’, Kalecki argues that under certain circumstances – such as a long boom 
that empowers workers – capitalists would willingly sacrifice profits to defend their hegem-
ony.79 A similar view is marshalled by Stephen Marglin, who claims that capitalists often 
 
78 Kalecki (1967: 114). 
79 Kalecki (1943). 
35 
 
forego efficient innovations to safeguard their overall power.80 And the same perception un-
derpins the broader Monopoly Capital notion of an underconsumption crisis, where the in-
creased power of capitalists, revealed by their higher degree of monopoly, undermines their 
ultimate interest in growth-led accumulation.81 On these matters, CasP argues instead that 
capitalists scarcely sacrifice their accumulation interests to regain their power. They don’t have 
to. Their very differential capitalization is driven by and represents their power to start with. 
 
15. So power in your approach is both the means and the end of accumulation, and capitalists 
leverage power to increase it further for its own sake. But what exactly do you mean by power? 
Also, in your work you refer to different ‘modes of power’. How do these modes of power 
relate to your concept of power? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. To reiterate, we have argued that in capitalism power is a quantitative re-
lationship between entities, and that the key gauge of this power is differential capitalization. 
In our view, this differential capitalization represents confidence in obedience – the confidence of 
the ruling class in the obedience of the ruled. And the reason is as follows. 
Human societies invented the general concept of ‘power’ – or ‘force’ in its broader sense – 
to denote a mover: something that causes things to change (or, alternatively, to stay the same 
despite the apparent impact of another mover).82 Change itself can be observed directly or de-
tected indirectly: a flood, a war, the plague, a fortune being won, the ups and downs of the 
business cycle, the trajectories of heavenly bodies, the vibrations of atoms in a gas – these 
movements are all accessible to our senses and instruments, or so it seems. We can also ob-
serve or detect resistance to change – a tree that doesn’t succumb to a storm, a wall that rejects 
bullets, an economy unresponsive to supply-side policies. But what we cannot observe or de-
tect – at least not objectively and unambiguously – are the movers of these changes.  
‘Force is nothing but its effect’, say its modern theorists from Kepler and Spinoza to Hegel 
and Marcuse. This elegant tautology, though, is too general. In and of itself, an effect never 
reveals, let alone unambiguously, a specific mover. The motions of the heavenly bodies, for 
example, taken as an ‘effect’, have been traced to the will of God, the inherent properties of 
the bodies, Newton’s gravitation and Einstein’s curved space, among other explanations. It 
seems clear, then, that when we choose a mover – whether we call it ‘spirit’, ‘cause’, ‘force’, 
‘law’ or ‘power’ more generally – our selection is inherently speculative and open to interpre-
tation.83 From this viewpoint, there isn’t – and cannot be – a single, ‘correct’ concept of power. 
The way we conceptualize power is always embedded in and conditioned by our broader cos-
mology and the structure of our society.  
In our day and age, most students of society, heterodox as well as orthodox, tend to follow 
Max Weber’s notion of social power as a ‘resource’, something like a ‘stock of energy’ that 
can mobilize things. When this resource is distributed more or less evenly between the relevant 
 
80 Marglin (1974). 
81 Bichler and Nitzan (2014a: Box 1, p. 69). 
82 Jammer (1957). For the purpose of discussion here, we use the terms ‘power’ and ‘force’ interchangeably.  
83 For a brave attempt to impose some semblance of order on these slippery concepts, see Bunge (1961, 1979). 
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social entities, it is often manifested as ‘power to’. When it is distributed unevenly, it tends to 
appear as ‘power over’. For example, the economic stock of ‘real capital’ endows its owners 
with the power to do things (produce, innovate, mobilize resources for the good of society) as 
well as control others (by monopolizing industry, cornering the market, exploiting workers, 
bribing politicians, etc.). And we can say the same about other, extra-economic ‘sources of 
power’ – such as political power, military power and ideological power, to name a few.84 Each 
of these sources of power, goes the argument, can mobilize society as a whole, or pit some of 
its elements or subsystems against others. 
The CasP conception of social power is totally different. As noted, power in our view is 
not a stand-alone entity or resource, but a quantitative relationship between entities; a rela-
tionship that, in its most elemental form, represents the ruling class’ confidence in the obedi-
ence of the ruled. The rulers try to impose their rule against their subjects’ resistance – re-
sistance to them as concrete rulers, and occasionally resistance to their very system of rule. 
And the degree to which the ruling class is confident in being able to withstand and overcome 
this resistance is what we call power.85 
Now, on the face of it, this definition may seem awfully subjective. It isn’t. Confidence-in-
obedience-read-power represents the collective mindset of the ruling class. It is not a mere as-
sortment of individual opinions, oddities, illusions and delusions, but the rulers’ common as-
sessment and understanding of their shared reality. Of course, the rulers, even as a group, often 
are misinformed or misjudge their situation, sometimes by a lot. But these misperceptions – 
which usually arise in the context of significant change – rarely last for long. Sooner or later, 
they are incorporated into the ruling class’ collective understanding and alter their confidence 
in obedience – either up or down. To persuade yourself that this is indeed the case, just think 
of how long it took Belshazzar, King of Babylon, to realize that his rule had ended, the French 
monarchy to succumb to the French Revolution and the Soviet ruling class to realize their 
communist regime had collapsed. 
Moving from the general to the specific, the concrete appearance of confidence in obedience 
varies significantly over time and across societies. To understand this variance, we tentatively 
suggest that society’s ‘concepts of power’ (COP) are intimately bound up with its ‘mode of 
power’ (MOP), and that the specific ways in which the rulers conceive, assess and measure 
their power are deeply intertwined with the concrete ways in which they creorder their socie-
ties. In this sense, we might say that concepts of power (COP) and modes of power (MOP) are 
fused as singular COP-MOP bundles. 
Our work on this subject examines and compares, if only briefly and provisionally, three 
general COP-MOPs: the empires and city states of the ancient river deltas, feudalism and cap-
italism.86 The examination is dialectical in that it explores the specific relations of, conceptions 
 
84 For example, Russell (1938), Parsons (1969), Bourdieu (1984, 1986) and Mann (1986, 1993). 
85 The opposing sides of this dialectic are narrated in two sixteenth-century texts: Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532), a 
universal how-to guide for the power-hungry ruler; and de La Boétie’s The Politics of Obedience (1975), a forgotten 
brilliant essay about subversion and resistance in the name of human autonomy. 
86 Cf. Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 13) and Bichler and Nitzan (2018: Part III). 
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of and resistance to power in each COP-MOP; the features that make these conceptions-rela-
tions persist; and the reasons why they eventually disintegrate or capitulation to a new COP-
MOP.  
Our starting point, mentioned earlier in the interview, is Lewis Mumford’s imaginative 
notion of the megamachine. According to Mumford, the first machines were not material, but 
social. They comprised large-scale, complex hierarchical structures – hence the prefix ‘mega’ 
– and they fulfilled Franz Reuleaux’s classic definition of a machine as ‘a combination of re-
sistant parts, each specialized in function, operating under human control, to utilize energy 
and to perform work’.87 These megamachines differed from subsequent, material machines in 
that they were made not of physical cogs, but of human beings.  
The first megamachines, Mumford argues, emerged in the ancient river deltas of Mesopo-
tamia and Egypt some time in the fifth millennium BCE, and then appeared, often inde-
pendently, in other parts of the world. Their material output – from irrigation systems and 
public works, to large bureaucracies and standing armies, to palaces and megalomaniacal 
graves – was phenomenal. But this output was a means to an end. The ultimate goal of the 
megamachine, says Mumford, was power for its own sake. It was power that demonstrated – 
to others, but mostly to the rulers themselves – that they, the rulers, were omnipotent. That 
their mastery over nature and humans annulled their Gilgameshian fear of death. That they, 
just like the gods, were immortal. 
In our view, this quest for immortality and the megamachine that demonstrates it charac-
terize all COP-MOPs. All COP-MOPs, we argue, are driven by power for the sake of power. 
And they all create mechanized hierarchies to achieve, sustain and, most importantly, aug-
ment that power. These are the similarities. The differences concern, first, the depth, breadth 
and flexibility of their hierarchies; and second, the symbols – particularly the concepts of 
power – that give those hierarchies their particular shape and hold them together.88 
If we are to offer a very rough outline of these differences, we could say, again tentatively, 
that the ancient MOPs had deep hierarchies; that these hierarchies were relatively rigid; and 
that their COPs, tied mostly to threatening religious hierarchies, were largely ‘magical’ (or, as 
Ulf Martin points out, that the concepts of power and the divinities they represented were the 
same).89 By contrast, the feudal MOPs had shallower but more flexible hierarchies, and their 
COPs, although still sanctified by menacing religion (more in Europe, less so in Japan), were 
largely ‘ontological’, representing land, knights, serfs and plenty of physical destruction.90 The 
capitalist MOP surpasses both in that its hierarchies have far greater breath and depth and are 
 
87 Mumford (1967: 191). 
88 Blair Fix (2017) shows that the spread and depth of hierarchies are positively correlated with energy capture 
across time and space. This correlation, he suggests, arises because hierarchical organization is the most effective 
way of capturing energy. The opposite interpretation is explored in Bichler and Nitzan (2017b), who argue that 
hierarchies are vehicles of power, and that their correlation with energy capture arises because the taller and more 
numerous the hierarchies, the greater the energy needed to build and sustain them.  
89 In Sumer, for example, the threat to unleash the wrath of one’s gods on one’s enemies was taken with utmost 
seriousness by all sides. God-Kings and sacred rulers were prevalent in most of the ancient river deltas. 
90 ‘[W]ar in the Middle Ages’ writes Le Goff (1965: 29), ‘was marked by systemic devastation. Its purpose was not 
so much to defeat the enemy militarily, as to undermine its economic and social power by burning and destroying 
crops, houses and villages’. 
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infinitely more flexible, and in that its key COP – the differential capitalization of power – is 
a secular, ‘operational’ symbol (a symbol that constitutes and creorders reality).  
The greater breadth, depth and flexibility of the capitalist MOP has much to do with its 
radically different COP. All rulers need quantitative yardsticks to help them formulate, assess, 
express and impose their confidence-in-obedience-read-power. There are many such yard-
sticks – from the size of their land and its yield, to the number of people under their control, 
to their military might, their precious stones and metals and the gifts their receive – and the 
key point here is that, in general, the units of these yardsticks tend to differ from each other. 
They are incommensurate. In and of themselves, they cannot be compared and aggregated, 
which means that their totality – and by extension, the rulers’ assessment of their overall power 
– is difficult to formulate. 
Capitalism is the only MOP to remove this barrier. Its main COP – the forward-looking 
differential capitalization of power – is a pure universal number, comparable throughout the 
space-time of capitalism. It quantifies power in the very same way for all entities, in all capi-
talist societies and at all points in time. Furthermore, and crucially, it helps capitalists project 
and assess their future power – and in so doing allows them to strategize and act in a seemingly 
universal, rational fashion, something that the rulers of the ancient and feudal COP-MOPs 
could not even fathom. In our view, it is this universal conception of power, perhaps more than 
anything else, that enables capitalists to built taller, broader and more flexible hierarchies than 
those of any other historical COP-MOP. 
 
16. Can you illustrate your understanding of the capitalist COP-MOP with a concrete exam-
ple? Specifically, how does the capitalist conception of confidence in obedience illuminate the 
operation of the capitalist mode of power?   
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Take the stock market – the most sensitive barometer of contemporary 
capitalism and its main guide for capitalist action. The conventional view of its booms and 
busts is based, directly or indirectly, on some notion of ‘valuation’; or, as we suggested earlier 
in the interview, on comparing equity prices to the economy’s underlying ‘fundamentals’ and 
then blaming the oscillating difference – whether bubbles or crashes – on Galtonian mean-
reverting distortions and irrationalities. The COP-MOP fusion offers a radically different take. 
In our paper, ‘A CasP Model of the Stock Market’, we examine the equity market not from 
the mechanical perspective of a distorted economy, but from the dialectical triangle of capital-
ized power, systemic fear and strategic sabotage.91  
A key aspect of this examination is the connection between the stock market’s performance 
on the one hand and the capitalists’ power-read-confidence-in-obedience on the other. This 
confidence, we argue, has two opposite dimensions. The first, extroverted dimension is the way 
in which capitalists price their equities. When capitalists think that, as a group, their power 
over the underlying population is rising, they express this collective confidence by buying 
stocks and bidding up their prices. Now, since we are dealing here with capitalized power, the 
 
91 Bichler and Nitzan (2016). For a critical extension, see Baines and Hager (2019). 
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increased price must be expressed relative to those whom the capitalists rule. And given that 
the majority of the ruled are wage earners and their dependents, a good rough benchmark is 
the wage rate. Figure 2 shows this differential in the United States, depicting the ratio between 
the S&P 500 price index and the average wage rate. We call this ratio the Power Index.  
Figure 2. The Dialectic of Power and Fear 
 
NOTES: The systemic fear index represents annual averages of the monthly series. It is constructed in two steps: 
(1) by measuring the 12-month trailing correlation between the S&P 500 stock price and EPS; and (2) by smoothing 
the result as a 120-month (10-year) trailing average. The S&P 500 price splices the following four sub-series: a 
combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the 
Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-
present). The wage rate splices hourly data for manufacturing production workers till 1946 with hourly data for 
nonfarm business-sector workers from 1947 onward. The last data points are for 2018. SOURCES: Annual S&P 
500 price is from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series code: _SPXD) and from Global Insight (GI) from 
1901 onward (series code: JS&PNS). The hourly wage rate splices the following series: Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Millennial Edition Online: hourly wages in manufacturing, all trades, 1865-1889 (series code: 
Ba4290), hourly earnings in manufacturing, all industries, 1890-1913 (series code: Ba4299), weekly earnings of 
production workers in manufacturing, 1914-1918 (series code: Ba4362), hourly earnings of production workers in 
manufacturing, 1919-1938 (series code: Ba4361); Global Insight (GI): average hourly earnings of production work-
ers in manufacturing, 1939-1946 (series code: AHPMFNS); Conference Board through GI: average hourly com-
pensation of all employees in the nonfarm business sector (series code: JRWSSNFE). Monthly S&P 500 price and 
EPS are from Robert J. Shiller’s online data archive 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls). 
                  
     
         
              
               
                    
                     
                         
                       
                       
                                     
                               
                                 
                             
                    
                
  
  
  
   
   
   
   
                                        
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
40 
 
The introverted dimension of the capitalists’ confidence in obedience is systemic fear. Cap-
italists, we argue, are driven to increase their capitalized power without end. That’s the basic 
purpose of their capitalist megamachine. And indeed, the only reason for them to buy stocks 
in the first place is that they expect stock prices – and by extension the Power Index – to rise 
even further. But this future increase is redistributional, by definition, and redistribution re-
quires more threats, further sabotage and greater violence. And here we get to the crucial point. 
The greater the power of capitalists, the greater the resistance to it, and therefore the more 
difficult it is to increase it even further. Power has limits, or asymptotes, and the closer capi-
talists get to those asymptotes, the greater their resort to threats, sabotage and violence.92 And 
as the bellicosity increases, so does the risk of a backlash – a recoil that might reduce the cap-
italists’ power, depose them or even undermine their very regime. This risk generates capitalist 
fear that, at the limit, becomes systemic – that is, fear for the very nature and even existence of 
their system.   
Now, in previous COP-MOPs, the systemic fear of their ruling classes was difficult if not 
impossible to observe – certainly by the underlying population – and it was usually revealed 
only in retrospect, after the rulers’ demise. But not so in the capitalist COP-MOP. Here we 
have a quantitative, real-time measure of this fear, generated by the capitalists’ own actions. 
This measure is depicted by the dotted blue line in Figure 2. We call it the Systemic Fear Index. 
To explain this index and why it represents systemic fear, begin with forward-looking cap-
italization, the omnipotent ritual that conditions capitalists to discount their expected future 
earnings all the way to eternity. In this ritual, past profits are irrelevant, by definition. They 
simply don’t get into the computations. Current profits do – but then, being a mere first drop 
in an infinitely long river of future earnings, their relative significance is practically nil. So, in 
principle, capitalization – and therefore stock prices – should move pretty much independently 
of current profits. The correlation between them should hover around zero. Except it doesn’t. 
The dotted line in Figure 2 depicts the 12-month trailing correlation between monthly 
stock prices and earnings per share (EPS), smoothed as a 10-year trailing average.93 And as the 
data show, most of the time the correlation isn’t zero. First, its long-term movement is V-
shaped. It declined from around +0.4 in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to -
0.2 in the early 1980s, only to soar to a record high of +0.6 recently. And, second, its short-
term fluctuations are pretty pronounced. 
What explains these deviations from zero correlation? Why do capitalists adhere to their 
ritual at certain times (for instance, during much of the period between the 1920s and the 
1990s) and abandon it in others (for example, prior to the 1920s and from the 2000s onward)? 
The reason, we submit, has to do with capitalist fear, and this fear is intertwined with capital-
ized power. According to Thomas Hobbes, the bourgeois individual, locked in a war of all 
against all, feels compelled to increase his differential power without end – but then, the more 
 
92 Bichler and Nitzan (2012a, 2014b). 
93 The computation is simple: for every month, we measure the Pearson correlation between stock prices and EPS 
over the previous 12 months (current month included); then we smooth the series as a 10-year trailing average; 
finally we convert the results from monthly to annual observations. 
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power he possesses, the more he dreads losing it all. The result, Hobbes points out, is an on-
going cycle, with fear stoking a hunger for power and the amassment of power heightening 
the very fear that begot that hunger in the first place.94 This dialectic, we argue, is what Figure 
2 demonstrates.  
The data show that our Systemic Fear Index, measured by the price-EPS correlation, and 
our Power Index are in lockstep (with a Pearson correlation of +0.84 out of a maximum of 
+1), and this lockstep is hardly a statistical fluke. When the Power Index is low – as it was, for 
instance, during the early 1980s, before the onset of neoliberalism – capitalists realize that this 
power has a lot of room to grow before provoking any meaningful resistance, let alone a threat 
to their system as a whole. And in this situation, with little or no systemic fear to speak of, 
they feel free to concentrate on the long-term future trend of profit and ignore its current ups 
and downs. When that happens, the price-EPS correlation is low and can even be negative.  
But when the Power Index is very high – as it is currently (2018) – capitalists can no longer 
enjoy this forward-looking luxury. Their high-power situation makes them realize, individu-
ally and as a group, that augmenting their capitalized power even further is not only difficult, 
but also risky; that such an increase might trigger a backlash; and that if this backlash persists, 
it could endanger their regime. In short, they are struck with systemic fear – an apprehension 
for the very future of their system. Now, although they would rarely admit it, this systemic 
fear blurs their forward-looking vision. And as their future becomes increasingly opaque, their 
long-term profit projections, once solid, ‘melt into air’. Frustrated, they are forced to shorten 
their time horizon. Instead of peering into an abysmal future, they take their solace from the 
glorious present. Rather than tying their stock prices to fuzzy profit projections, they let them 
trace the month-to-month gyrations of current EPS. And as their systemic fear rises, the price-
EPS correlation goes up in tandem. 
To recap, the very way in which capitalists price their stocks attests the two opposing as-
pects of their power: their confidence in obedience shown by the stock-price-to-wage ratio 
(Power Index) and their systemic fear registered by the their price-EPS correlation (the Sys-
temic Fear Index). In capitalism, power and the fragility of power are depicted by the market’s 
ticker.    
 
17. Your idea of historicizing modes of power resembles Marx’s attempt to do so with modes 
of production, while your emphasis on power resonates, or so it seems, with the work of Fou-
cault. How do you see the relationship between your approach and theirs? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. Our connection with Foucault is only superficial. Yes, Foucault dissects 
multiple aspects of power, their concepts, myths and manifestations in madness, punishment, 
education, medicine and sexuality, among other domains. But the gist of his inquiry is dia-
metrically opposed to ours. Whereas CasP tries to identify and theorize the universal aspects 
of power and the different ways in which these universal aspects manifest themselves in his-
 
94 Hobbes (1691, first published in 1651: for example, 75 and 94). 
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torically specific COP-MOPs, particularly capitalism, Foucault does the reverse. His work de-
nies universality. Since the only things that ‘exist’ are power-driven discourses, there can be no 
universal reality of power, no autonomous subjects to contest this reality and, by extension, 
no way to study it systematically, let alone scientifically, as a singular regime. The only way 
to engage power is through stand-alone deconstructions, insights, reflections, comments and 
claims about its ever-changing kaleidoscope. 
In this sense, we are far closer to the Marxist framework. Marx and his followers were the 
first to theorize the ‘capitalist system’ as whole. When they speak about the capitalist mode of 
production (and modes of production more generally), they have in mind a totalizing regime. 
True, this regime revolves around and is largely determined by the forces and relations of 
production, which is different than what we argue. But it is also dialectically intertwined with 
the processes of alienation, fetishization, false consciousness and oppressive tolerance, among 
others. Understood as a broad system, the capitalist mode of production, like its predecessors, 
is associated with a particular class structure anchored in production and gives rise to specific 
political institutions of power, violence and state, complete with their internal lineages and 
contradictions. So, similarly to CasP, the Marxist approach tries to articulate a universal order 
rather than deny it. 
The key difference with CasP is that Marx’s framework, much like the liberal one, remains 
hostage to the Victorian world of material production. Moreover, and crucially, in his zeal for 
a totalizing approach, Marx, just like the liberals, insisted on developing a singular language – 
in his case, based on labour.  
According to Marx, the process of accumulation subjects everyone – including capitalists 
and workers – to its universal dictates. This process, he argued, is experienced in two different 
ways: for workers, it materializes as ‘simple circulation’, C  M  C, whose starting and end 
points are counted in use values of different qualities; for capitalists, it appears as ‘expanded 
circulation’, M  C  M’, with the beginning and end points counted in monetary, or ex-
change values of different quantities. But both circuits, although totally different in purpose, 
are denominated in the same units of socially necessary abstract labour time.  
In our view, this singular denomination contradicted Marx’s own logic. Workers are 
forced to participate in accumulation in order to reproduce themselves. So to describe their 
activities in terms of the labour they put in and the use value they take out makes sense both 
for them and for those who analyse them. Capitalists, though, are compelled to accumulate 
for totally different reasons. According to Marx, their role is to regulate, control and impose 
the rule of capital. This regulation, control and imposition is not about production and con-
sumption, but about the power of capital. And the power of capital, with its complex instru-
mentalities, triumphs and crises, cannot be expressed in and reduced to units of labour and 
use value.  
 Given that, according to Marx, the accumulation of capital occurs through the exploita-
tion and oppression of workers, the two circuits are inherently conflictual. The first embodies 
the creative essence of humanity and its universal potential for autonomy, the second the at-
tempt to alienate and disable that very potential for capitalist ends. Marx tried to describe the 
two circuits with a single language – but since the two circuits are inherently contradictory, 
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the fact that this language fitted the first circuit made it inadequate for the second, by defini-
tion. In this way, Marx’s singular language ended up undermining his theory, making it diffi-
cult to adjust to the twentieth century and impossible to fit to the twenty-first. 
If CasP has succeeded in shedding some light on the regime of capital, it is because it never 
has – nor can it – theorize humanity as a whole. Unlike Marx, CasP focuses solely on the 
rulers. It uses only one language, the language of capitalized power. This language translates 
and reduces the huge variety of phenomena that baffles the masses at the bottom to a simple, 
mechanical script that is perfectly legible to their ruling class at the top. It is the language with 
which capitalists understand and shape their world, with which they express their convictions, 
hopes and aspirations, and with which they mechanize their human subjects as cogs in their 
megamachine. 
And this language is revealing because, for the most part, it manages to creorder society, 
including its ruling class, in the image of its own ‘operational symbols’. Rulers tend to see the 
world from a singular viewpoint. Locked into their unitary class logic, they become subservi-
ent to their own architecture of power. In this sense, dominant capital can rarely deviate from 
the boundaries of its own architecture, even if it wants to. Its members must accept the very 
logic they impose on the rest of humanity. And the more effective they are in imposing their 
logic, the more predictable they themselves become. And this, we argue, is why the world they 
preside over can be theorized and to some extent anticipated.  
But the language of capitalized power can say very little about the human beings who are 
subjected to this power. Of course, the ruling class uses this language to observe, analyse, an-
ticipate and shape their subjects’ ‘behaviour’, ‘reactions’ and ‘choices’ – whether ‘rational’ or 
‘irrational’ – but this class knows little or nothing about their subjects’ inner consciousness, 
awareness, thoughts, intentions, imagination and aspirations. To paraphrase Cornelius Cas-
toriadis, humanity for them is like a ‘magma’, a seemingly smooth surface that conceals un-
known currents and autonomous potentials.95 From the rulers’ viewpoint of capitalized power, 
this magma is a black box. Its regularities can be predicted and moulded, but only from the 
outside and never completely. And when the counterforces of the magma erupt, however in-
frequently – as they had, for example, in the Paris Revolution of 1968 and the 1989-1991 col-
lapse of the Soviet Union – the fixated rulers and their Solaris-like pundits often find them-
selves totally unprepared and utterly surprised.96  
 
18. Many of your general ideas took time and research to evolve and develop. Could you walk 
us through some of your early steps in this journey? How did your concrete findings differ 
from those of liberals and Marxists? How have those differences helped shape your general 
approach? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. We started our joint research in the early 1980s, when we were still univer-
sity students. Our main focus was Israel – partly because we were Israelis, but also because we 
 
95 Castoriadis (1987: Ch. 7). 
96 In Stanislaw Lem’s Solaris (1970), the pundits develop a huge literature with highly complex models to predict 
physical eruptions on an alien planet whose nature they don’t even begin to understand.   
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found the Israeli case fascinating. Back then, we considered ourselves neo-Marxists and were 
influenced by the Monopoly Capital approach, pioneered by Kalecki, Steindl, Tsuru, Baran, 
Sweezy, Huberman, Braverman and Magdoff. The reason for this influence had a lot to do 
with the Israeli reality.  
As we understood it, the theory of Monopoly Capital argued that the rise of large firms 
creates oligopolistic tendencies; that these tendencies impose downward technological pres-
sures on costs and upward inflationary pressures on prices; that those opposing pressures cre-
ate a tendency of the surplus to rise and therefore a risk of underconsumption; that in order 
for growth to continue, the expanding surplus must be ‘absorbed’; that this absorption requires 
institutionalized waste; that this institutionalized waste tends to take the form of rising military 
spending and the bloating of the financial sector; and that when these wasteful outlets are 
insufficient, the result is a combination of stagnation and inflation, or stagflation. 
At the time, this description seemed to fit Israel like a glove. The country’s business sector 
was highly concentrated (much more than the United States’), domestic military spending ab-
sorbed nearly one-fifth of the GDP, finance was the largest sector and the stock market was 
booming, and the macroeconomy was highly stagflationary. In parallel, we also witnessed a 
series of related processes, from the emergence of deregulation and privatization, to growing 
militarization, the ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories, the rise of the far-right and 
the strengthening of religious and messianic forces. 
Our initial aim, then, was to test the Monopoly Capital thesis on Israel. But we quickly 
realized that this was easier said than done. The first problem was theoretical. The Monopoly 
Capital thesis, despite its multiple ‘microeconomic’ departures from classical Marxism, was 
still ‘macroeconomic’ in nature. It differentiated small from large firms but, for the most part, 
examined them not directly, but indirectly – by analyzing their alleged impact on broad sectors 
such as finance and advertising, on macroeconomic indicators like growth and inflation and 
on geopolitical processes such as neo-imperialism.  
This type of ‘macro-Marxism’ (our term) was highly suspect in our view, though initially 
we couldn’t point out exactly why. And this is where the second problem kicked in. At the 
time, Israel had no systematic time series – financial or otherwise – on its leading firms, so it 
was practically impossible to say anything concrete about their role as ‘monopoly capital’. It 
was only after months of physically excavating the country’s government, public and private 
libraries and archives (none of these sources were computerized) that we managed to put to-
gether the first-ever systematic dataset for the country’s dominant capital.97 And it was only 
then, armed with this newly constructed database, an IBM clone and a few 5¼ floppy disks, 
that we finally realized what the problem was.  
As it turns out, the performance of the large Israeli firms was not simply different from 
that of their smaller counterparts. In many cases it was opposite.98 To give a few examples, 
inflation and stagnation benefitted dominant capital while harming smaller ones, military 
spending and arms exports boosted the fortunes of large firms while undermining those of their 
 
97 Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1988). 
98 Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1988), Bichler and Nitzan (1996a) and Nitzan and Bichler (2000b). 
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lesser counterparts and civilian government spending served the small economy while hurting 
the big one.  
These opposite movements meant that we couldn’t simply aggregate these two groups into 
an overall macroeconomic picture. Moreover, since the performance of these groups was inti-
mately intertwined with the country’s domestic politics, wars and international relations more 
generally, and given that dominant capital was actively shaping these latter processes, it was 
no longer possible to think of capital accumulation as an economic process that is merely ‘af-
fected’ by politics.  
And there was more. Having read Veblen while researching the Israeli reality, it dawned 
on us that ‘economic growth’ might be a deeply misleading indicator. It was misleading not 
only because it was difficult if not impossible to measure (whether in utils or SNALT), but 
also, and perhaps more so, because it concealed the most important driver of accumulation – 
strategic sabotage.  
Orthodox political economists glorify growth. When the economy grows, they argue, all 
incomes rise, and the opposite occurs when the economy contracts. Marxists take a somewhat 
different view, arguing that, under certain circumstances, unemployment and stagnation can 
be leveraged, deliberately or automatically through the business cycle, to discipline workers 
and sometimes even redistribute their income in favour of capitalists. But the use of these lev-
ers is inherently temporary. In the long-run, the Marxist view on growth isn’t much different 
from the neoclassical. According to Marx, the two intertwined circuits of capital – the workers’ 
simple reproduction C  M  C and the capitalists’ expanded reproduction M  C  M’ – 
move in the same direction. In other words, when it comes to growth, the interests of the two 
class enemies are one and the same. And this convergence is attested by the ‘real’ data: in the 
United States, for example, the constant-dollar growth rates of GDP, the capital stock, capi-
talist income and the compensation of employees all move in tandem.99  
But if we think of accumulation in terms of power, economic growth is no longer a com-
mon interest. And that is what our Israeli research showed us already at this early stage: 
growth might serve workers and the underlying population more generally, but it often under-
mines the redistributional power interests of capitalists. Moreover, the overall emphasis is in-
verted. For conventional political economy, profit and capital are hard ‘economic’ entities 
associated with production and consumption, while distribution is a ‘social’ entity, the pur-
view of sociology, politics and other ‘soft’ disciplines. If we focus on power, though, this sep-
aration disappears. From this viewpoint, accumulation is driven by redistribution – and this 
drive reshapes the entire hierarchical complex of production, finance, government, the mili-
tary, culture and international relations. 
Eventually, these early realizations led us to think of two types of ‘social spaces’.100 Ac-
cording to Einstein, there are two cosmological notions of space: the Newtonian view, in 
which space is an independent container of all material objects; and the Leibnitzian conception, 
 
99 Bichler and Nitzan (2014: Figures 12 and 13, pp. 139-140). 
100 Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 278-282). 
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where space is the positional quality of the world of material objects.101 Orthodox political econ-
omists, we argue, take the Newtonian view. As they see it, society’s entities – consumers, 
workers, firms, governments, NGOs, etc. – exist in an independent space. The logic of this 
space – its economic laws, its political drives, etc. – governs the entities it contains, but the 
entities themselves have no impact on the space they occupy and whose logic they obey. By 
contrast, Marx’s political economy is Leibnitzian, in that its social entities are dialectically 
intertwined with and therefore gradually transform the very space they constitute and the laws 
of motion that they end up conforming to.  
In our view, though, there is something amiss in the Marxist setup. By forcing on capital-
ism the universal language of labour, Marx ended up making both workers and capitalists 
growth seekers. And by insisting on this common goal, he eliminated, in one fell swoop, what 
CasP argues is the main positional property of capitalists: their perpetual quest to re-distribute 
– or, in the terminology of the Leibnitzian space, re-position – incomes and assets. Contrary 
to Marx, we argue that capitalists seek redistribution – and specifically, differential accumula-
tion – and that they seek this differential not as a mere means of growing their ‘real’ assets, but 
as an end in itself. In this sense – and in contradistinction to the Marxist view – their very purpose 
is to continuously reposition-read-creorder the Leibnitzian space they inhabit/constitute. And 
if our emphasis here is correct, it calls for a sea-change in the way in which we study society 
and seek to change it. 
Although this sharper conceptualization came only years later, it was obvious to us, al-
ready in the early 1980s, that both macro-liberalism and macro-Marxism were inadequate, in 
principle, and that we needed to abandon the aggregate view altogether. The world of capitalist 
power was redistributional by definition, and that made it inherently disaggregate. Disaggrega-
tion, we realized, was not merely a more accurate or more detailed method of describing and 
analyzing the political economy, but an essential built-in feature of accumulation as such. 
 
19. How has your disaggregate approach developed into an overall theory of accumulation? 
In your work, you’ve articulated and researched different ‘regimes of differential accumula-
tion’. Do these regimes yield results that are fundamentally different than those offered by 
conventional macroeconomics or Marxist accounts of growth and crisis? 
 
Bichler & Nitzan. The idea of differential accumulation first emerged in our analysis of Israeli 
holding groups and of the leading armament and petroleum companies that benefited from 
Middle East Energy Conflicts.102 Initially, our research was fairly instrumental, trying to ‘con-
nect’ assorted aspects of the political economy (inflation, stagnation, military spending, Mid-
dle East wars, etc.) with the differential accumulation of dominant capital (the Israeli holding 
groups relative to the average and the leading petroleum firms compared to the Fortune 500). 
It was only during our work on inflation that we began considering this subject more generally 
 
101 Einstein (1954: xi-xv) and Agassi (1969). 
102 Bichler, Nitzan and Rowley (1989), Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989), Nitzan, Rowley and Bichler (1989), 
Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1989), Nitzan and Bichler (1995) and Bichler and Nitzan (1996b). 
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and topologically, and it was only then that ‘regimes differential accumulation’ emerged as a 
unifying concept.103 
Focusing specifically on a firm’s differential earnings, we proposed that, analytically, these 
earnings can be increased in two ways: (1) by raising the firm’s differential ‘breadth’ (the size 
of its organization measured in employees relative to the average); and (2) by raising the firm’s 
differential ‘depth’ (its profit per employee relative to the average). Each of these two paths 
can be further divided, again analytically, into external and internal trajectories. Breadth (the 
relative number of employees) can be increased externally through ‘greenfield’ investment 
(building new capacity faster than the average), or internally through amalgamation (merging 
or acquiring firms faster than the average). Similarly, depth (profit per employee) can be aug-
mented internally by cutting costs or externally by raising prices faster than others. 
This simple analytical framework has proven enormously fruitful for three related reasons. 
First, unlike the neoclassical and Marxist theories of accumulation, its categories are easy to 
measure. They rely not on utils or SNALT, but on readily observable monetary magnitudes, 
and straightforward measurements help make the theories they give rise to empirically re-
searchable and scientifically refutable. Second, the framework encompasses not only the so-
called economic/material/productive dimensions of accumulation, but the full gamut of its 
power underpinnings. This encompassing view expropriates accumulation from the death-grip 
of economics, putting it back where its belongs, at the centre of capitalism. Third, and most 
broadly, it allows us to theorize and research the changing nature of capital accumulation and 
the transformation of the overall social reality as two sides of the same creordering – or repo-
sitioning – of the Leibnitzian social space. 
Begin with the conventional view. As noted, most political economists take it for granted 
that accumulation thrives on overall growth and relative price stability. In terms of our own 
scheme, they argue that, in order to accumulate, capitalists must boost greenfield investment 
(external breadth) and cut costs (internal depth). The other two paths are considered irrelevant 
(if they are considered at all). Amalgamation (internal breadth) is seen as a mere change of 
ownership and therefore irrelevant to the accumulation of ‘real’ capital; and price inflation 
(external depth) is considered self-defeating for individual firms and neutral for them in the 
aggregate.  
CasP research, though, shows that reality is exactly the opposite. When we shift our focus 
from accumulation in general to dominant capital in particular, and from absolute profit to 
differential earnings, growth and price stability recede in importance and amalgamation and 
inflation take the lead.  
On the breadth side, the continued ascent of dominant capital has been underwritten not 
by greenfield investment, but by a long-term uptrend of mergers & acquisitions – both abso-
lutely and relatively to the money spent on new plant and equipment.104 Moreover, the histor-
ical expansion of mergers & acquisitions – from individual industries (horizontal mergers), to 
overall sectors (vertical), to the national envelope (conglomerate), to the world as a whole 
(global) – suggests that dominant capital pushes globalization not for the greater efficiency and 
 
103 Nitzan (1992), Nitzan and Bichler (2000b) and (2001) . 
104 Nitzan (2001) and Francis, Bichler and Nitzan (2013). 
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lower costs of the ‘free market’, but for the direct augmentation-through-amalgamation of its 
capitalized power.    
Similarly with the depth side of inflation. As noted, political economists tend to concen-
trate on so-called real magnitudes and see inflation as neutral at best and a friction at worse. 
In our opinion, one reason for this common disregard is historical timing: the analytical struc-
ture of political economy was fixed in the deflationary nineteenth century rather than in the 
inflationary twentieth. During the nineteenth century, prices trended downwards, and for the 
political economists of the period this downtrend made perfect sense. Capitalist organizations, 
both private firms and liberal governments, were small in size, currencies were pegged to pre-
cious metals and the larger use of credit as ownership was still in its infancy. In this seemingly 
competitive context, it appeared only natural that the technical progress of capitalism trans-
lated into deflation rather than inflation. The twentieth century, though, reversed these tenden-
cies. Firms and governments grew in size, markets became oligopolistic, credit markets bal-
looned and currencies were floated. Prices, which zigzagged downwards during the nineteenth 
century, were now rising without end. Even in relatively stable countries, such as the United 
States and Great Britain, they soared by thousands of per cents over the century, while in other 
countries they often rose even faster. Academically, though, these reversals came too late. The 
structure of political economy, having been set a century earlier, was already fossilized, and 
political economists, realizing that their ‘real-terms’ theories left no room for the reality of 
inflation, had no choice but to blame the annoying phenomenon on ‘distortions’. 
CasP is free of this baggage. Whereas according to Milton Freidman inflation is always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, for CasP it is always and everywhere a matter of 
redistribution. While Friedman’s inflation is kickstarted at the aggregate level, CasP’s originates 
at the disaggregate level, from where it expands to appear as an aggregate process. And where 
Friedman sees the amount of money expanding faster than the quantity of commodifies, CasP 
sees different prices rising at different rates. Now these are all analytical statements, and they 
can be made consistent with each other if individual price changes are purely stochastic. If 
different prices move at different rates but these differentials are random, the associated redis-
tribution of income and assets will also be random, making inflation seem neutral and vindi-
cating Friedman. But as CasP research demonstrates, the price-change differentials – and 
therefore the associated redistribution of income and assets – are usually not stochastic in the 
least. If anything, they tend to be systematic.  
In our early studies on Israel, for example, we found inflation to systematically redistribute 
income to capitalists from workers, to firms that dealt with armament and finance from those 
that didn’t and to the larger holding groups from smaller companies.105 Subsequent CasP stud-
ies of the United States and of the global arena more generally added further evidence. They 
showed that inflation tends to redistribute income, again systematically, to capitalists from 
workers and to large firms from small ones;106 to those selling raw materials – including oil 
and grain – from those that don’t;107 and to firms that produce armament and gold from others 
 
105 Nitzan and Bichler (2000b). 
106 Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 16). 
107 Bichler and Nitzan (2004) and Baines (2014). 
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that do not.108 Moreover, and crucially, all of these studies indicated that the differential im-
pact of inflation, whatever it may be, tends to be driven by strategic sabotage, and that this 
sabotage is almost always associated with some degree of stagnation. In other words, they 
indicated that inflation usually appears not as growth-flation, but as stag-flation.109 
The accumulation of these various studies led us to formulate two broader hypothesis. The 
first is that, from the early twentieth century onward, the differential accumulation of domi-
nant capital relied less and less on greenfield investment and cost-cutting and more and more 
on mergers and acquisitions and stagflation. We also hypothesized that this historical shift has 
grown increasingly binding. Modern firms, we proposed, could no longer rely on greenfield 
growth and cost-cutting, even if they wanted to. These older forms of accumulation might help 
them meet the average, but not beat it. In the new power reality of the twentieth century, they 
had to amalgamate, raise their relative prices or face differential decumulation. 
Second, while individual corporations could often engage simultaneously in both amal-
gamation and inflation, dominant capital as a whole finds this simultaneity difficult if not 
impossible to implement. The rise of corporate amalgamation and modern inflation have cre-
orded the entire state-capital complex, or, in our language, the ‘state of capital’. And in this 
new constellation, the societal conditions that are conducive to mergers & acquisition are hos-
tile for stagflation, and vice versa. For this reason, we suggested that dominant capital is likely 
to follow one of these paths at any one time, but not both. The default trajectory, we proposed, 
is internal breadth through amalgamation. This is the path of least resistance, and it has the 
greatest impact on differential accumulation. But when mergers & acquisitions run into barri-
ers, dominant capital, faced with the spectre of differential decumulation, is compelled to en-
gage in the much more risky and destabilizing path of inflationary sabotage, or stagflation. 
Finally, we suggested that, if both strategies fail, differential accumulation will turn negative.  
And so far, CasP work on the subject seems consistent with these hypotheses. Over the 
past century, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, the two regimes of differen-
tial accumulation – via amalgamation and through stagflation – have oscillated inversely to 
each other.110 And these oscillating regimes of differential accumulation have far-reaching con-
sequences, including at the global levels. 
For example, we noted earlier in the interview how Middle-East Energy Conflicts were 
triggered when the profitability of the leading oil companies trailed the average, and that these 
conflicts, once ignited, allowed these very companies to again beat the average and resume 
their differential accumulation. But, as our research showed, this cyclical recurrence of Energy 
Conflicts was itself nested in the even broader cycle of global breadth and depth.111 Each of 
these two regimes, we pointed out, was led by a different coalition of dominant capital. 
Breadth periods of amalgamation were led by what we called the ‘Mergerdollar-Technodollar’ 
coalition of high-tech, amalgamation-prone firms, whereas depth periods of stagflation were 
guided by the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition of large armament and oil companies. In 
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109 Nitzan (1992). 
110 Nitzan (2001) and Francis, Bichler and Nitzan (2013). 
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this way, when global differential accumulation relied on breadth, Energy Conflicts were less 
responsive to the plight of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. It was only when differ-
ential accumulation shifted into depth that the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition took the 
lead, that Energy Conflicts revived and that the differential fortunes of the armament and oil 
companies soared on the back of renewed regional wars.  
Another example of this broader nesting is offered by the great 1990s U-turns of South 
Africa and Israel, in which the former abandoned its Apartheid regime and the latter moved 
toward reconciliation with the Palestinians. There are many comparative accounts of the two 
countries and many attempts to reason their respective U-turns. Explanations of the later range 
from domestic resistance and revolts, to external pressures, to the exhaustion of their social 
structure of accumulation (especially in South Africa). But few if any have embedded these U-
turns in the changing nature of global accumulation in general and differential accumulation 
in particular.  
In ‘Going Global: The Great U-Turn in South Africa and Israel’,112 we argued that, by the 
1980s, the dominant capital groups in the two countries had grown too large for their respec-
tive home markets, and that in order to continue their differential accumulation, they had to 
break through their ‘national envelopes’ and go global. However, conflict-related sanctions 
and boycotts on the two countries made significant outward capital movement difficult if not 
impossible. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the global stagflation of the 1970s and 
1980s provided their dominant capital groups with a massive differential windfall: global in-
flation multiplied the price of gold many times over and in so doing boosted the differential 
profit of the South African conglomerates, while the depth-driven conflicts of the Middle East 
caused military production and exports by the Israeli holding groups to thrive. And as long as 
these differential boosts continued, a large chunk of the capitalist ruling classes in the two 
countries remained seated on the fence. They wanted the conflicts to end so that they could 
go global, but with their depth-driven differential accumulation being so lucrative, they were 
willing to wait. It was only with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the opening for business of 
the former Communist Bloc, the rise of emerging markets and the consequent global shift from 
depth to breadth that they finally got off the fence to openly support the end of Apartheid and 
reconciliation with the Palestinians. And it were these inner realignments of the elites, we 
argued, that tipped the balance in favour of the U-turns and serve to explain why the two U-
turns were, at least initially, relatively peaceful. It seems that, when it comes to the accumula-
tion of power and the associated creordering of the world, the ups and downs of inflation, just 
like the amalgamation of ownership, are anything but neutral.  
 
20. What are you working on now, and what is the programme of research you have set your-
selves for say the next five years? 
 
Bichler and Nitzan. We are currently working on concepts and modes of power. That should 
keep us busy for a while.  
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1. Flat Reality 
 
The French Revolution changed the world. In the new order, the masters no longer need Mon-
sieur Fouche and the thought police. They don’t need guillotines to clip brains and scissors to 
censor pamphlets. They don’t need strategic-studies institutes to manage oppression and navigate 
conflict. Instead, they prefer to subsidize ‘cultural pluralism’ and ‘critical studies’, support centres 
for democracy and privatization, and promote civil-society networks and global NGOs. They are 
no longer afraid of words. Or so we are told. . . . 
 
This paragraph opened our paper ‘Flat Reality’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2005), a short Hebrew tale 
of a botched review article, commissioned and rejected by the Journal of Cold War Studies. 
The affair started in 2003, when the journal invited us to review Avi Ben-Bassat’s edited 
volume, The Israeli Economy, 1985-1998. From Government Intervention To Market Economics 
(2002). Ben-Bassat, an economics professor and former research director at the Bank of Israel, 
assembled a collection of conventional economics articles, all adhering in one way or another 
to the ruling neoclassical dogma. And the book’s title tells you all you need to know about its 
content: a subsidized hymn to the victory of ‘capitalism’ over ‘socialism’. 
The invitation was puzzling primarily because our own book on Israel –The Global Political 
Economy of Israel (Nitzan and Bichler 2002) – debunked pretty much everything the Ben-Basset 
volume took for granted. It showed the neoclassical dogma’s deep-seated servitude to the Is-
raeli ruling class and the power it imposes on the underlying population, including the occu-
pation of the Palestinians; it demonstrated its anti-scientific rituals and religion-like ability to 
substitute fiction for reality; and it offered a new alternative – a radical, non-Marxist and non-
liberal approach called ‘Capital as Power’ (CasP) – with which we rewrote the history of Israel 
and the ways in which it related to the political economy of the Middle East and the world 
more broadly.  
 
1 Our title is borrowed from Professor Woland, the Devil in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita (1995). Shimshon 
Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan teach political economy at colleges and universities in Israel and Canada, respectively. 
All of their publications are available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net). Work on this 
paper was partly supported by the SSHRC. 
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Now, conservative journals rarely seek non-aligned radicals to demolish mainstream 
books – let alone obscure writers whose own books were yet to be reviewed. This was surely 
a mistake, but in order to be certain we decided to ask (emphasis added): 
 
August 19, 2003 
 
Dear Ken Monahan: 
 
Thank you kindly for your request. A point of clarification: does this invitation imply that you 
are committed to publishing the review as is?  
 
Looking forward,  
Jonathan  
 
Truth be told, we expected a retraction. Reading our query, a good editorial assistant 
would have checked our work, realized it was totally unfit and replied that refereed journals 
cannot pre-commit. But not this journal. Instead of retracting, it committed, in writing (empha-
sis added): 
 
August 20, 2003 
 
Dear Professor Nitzan, 
 
The review will be published as is, aside from minor stylistic editing. You’ll receive page proofs 
before the review is published, and will be given the chance to make any changes. 
 
Are you interested in reviewing the book? If so, let me know your postal address and we’ll get it 
out in today’s mail. 
 
Best wishes, 
Chitra Ramalingam 
Editorial Assistant 
Journal of Cold War Studies 
 
David Hume was dead on: although water at sea level always boils at 100 degrees Celsius, 
there is nothing in our science to tell us it will do so again the next time we try. And the same 
was true here: conservative journals reject out-of-the-loop radicals as a matter of course, yet 
the Journal of Cold War Studies broke the mould. It committed to publishing our work as is.  
We felt a bit dizzy. Maybe there was some truth to the relentless slogans of ‘liberalization’ 
and the ‘end of history’. Maybe the end of the Cold War had made capitalists more tolerant 
and their journals more receptive. Maybe it was our own prejudice that blinded us, so com-
pletely, to the new neoliberal openness.  
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But new world orders aside, we still had a problem: the Ben-Bassat collection was unre-
viewable. Its articles were typical ‘professional literature’ – dry, boring, full of banalities and 
neoclassical irrefutability. They read more like recycled advertisements than novel, vibrant 
science. Having mulled it over, we decided that instead of dissecting the volume piece by piece 
we should explain how books like that get written in the first place. In early 2004, we submitted 
the full review with the following clarification (emphasis added): 
 
January 29, 2004 
 
Dear Ken Monahan: 
 
First, let me apologize for the long delay in submitting the review and for not having contacted 
you earlier. There were many unexpected hurdles which prevented timely completion. But the 
review is finally written, jointly by Shimshon Bichler and myself, and is enclosed below. 
 
The review is roughly 1800 words. The significance of this book lies in the historical context in 
which it emerged, and it was impossible to explain this historical context in a very brief paper. I 
believe you’ll agree with this assessment after reading it. 
 
Best, 
Jonathan 
 
The editor’s office replied, immediately, with forward-looking liberal enthusiasm (emphasis 
added):  
 
January 29, 2004 
 
Dear Professors Nitzan and Bichler, 
 
Thank you for sending along your review. We appreciate the time and care you put into it, and 
will be in touch with page proofs at a time closer to publication. 
 
All the best, 
Philip Redko 
Editorial Assistant 
Journal of Cold War Studies 
 
And it also gave us the specific where-and-when details (emphasis added):  
 
  
4 
 
January 29, 2004 
 
Dear Professor Nitzan, 
 
Your review will most likely appear in Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 2004). 
 
Best, 
Philip Redko 
Editorial Assistant 
Journal of Cold War Studies 
 
The ride felt smooth and comfortable, as if we were travelling with the neoliberal messiah. 
But when the Fall issue came out, our review wasn’t in it. For its part, the journal remained 
reassuring. There was absolutely no reason to worry (emphasis added):  
 
November 17, 2004 
 
Dear Professor Nitzan, 
 
The book review will appear in the spring issue of the journal, which means that you will receive 
the page proofs as a PDF attachment in mid-late January. Please let us know if you are going to 
be away at the time, and we can arrange to have them sent to you earlier. 
  
Best wishes, 
Inna Livitz 
Editorial Assistant 
Journal of Cold War Studies 
 
There was also an added explanation: the delay was merely a technical matter of over-con-
gestion (emphasis added):  
 
November 18, 2004 
 
Dear Professor Nitzan, 
 
We could only include fourteen reviews in the Fall issue because of page limitations, so ten had 
to be postponed. I apologize for the delay. 
 
Sincerely, 
Philip Redko 
Editorial Assistant 
Journal of Cold War Studies 
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So we waited a few more months, only to realize that, for some reason – exogenous, no 
doubt – the supply and demand for articles were again ‘distorted’, and that our review had 
been postponed once again (emphasis added):  
 
February 17, 2005 
 
Dear Professor Nitzan,  
 
We are having a special issue in the spring, so your review will appear in the Summer 2005 is-
sue. The issue is going to press this week, and you will receive page proofs in mid-April.  
 
Best,  
Philip Redko  
Editorial Assistant  
Journal of Cold War Studies 
 
At this point, we started to doubt our newly found belief in neoliberal publishing. The 
journal insisted it wanted to print our piece, but judging by its inaction it seemed keen on 
killing it. 
The Editor in Chief, Mark Kramer, was flabbergasted. Our insinuations thick hints, he 
insisted, were completely misplaced. There was no censorship in his journal. Full stop. The 
real culprit wasn’t him. It was MIT Press. The cost-conscious publishing house overcharged 
for excess pages, and in so doing threw the market off balance and burdened his journal with 
ridiculous backlogs and undue delays (emphasis added):  
 
February 23, 2005 
 
The delay with your book review has absolutely nothing to do with censorship. I haven’t even 
seen your review, and I have no intention of censoring it irrespective of what it says. Our con-
tractual obligations with MIT Press impose severe page limits on us (limits that I despise but have 
to live with), so that means that we have often had to defer book reviews. I don’t like doing this 
at all, but it costs $31/page whenever we exceed the limit, so I don’t have much choice. The de-
ferral of book reviews has caused us to develop a large backlog of book reviews, and delays of 
over a year are unfortunately now the norm. To remedy this problem, we’re probably soon going 
to shift to a different publisher that will not be so obsessed with page limits, but until we switch, 
we have to live by MIT Press’s rules. I fully understand your frustration, but let me emphasize 
again that the delay has absolutely nothing to do with censorship. 
 
Mark Kramer 
 
To be honest, we have heard smarter excuses from liberal censors. So we pushed a bit 
further (emphasis added): 
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April 10, 2005 
 
Dear Phillip, 
 
Could you kindly confirm that the proofs of our paper will be sent to this email within the next 
week or so (nitzan@yorku.ca)? 
 
Best wishes, 
Jonathan Nitzan 
 
And that extra push was enough. The editors lost their composure and pulled out the scis-
sors. As it turned out, they weren’t going to publish our review after all (emphasis added):   
 
April 12, 2005 
 
Dear Professor Nitzan, 
 
We were going to include your review in the summer 2005 issue of the JCWS, but when we took 
another look at it recently, it struck us that your piece was simply much too long for a regular 
book review. If you can cut your review to the length specified in our original request (about 
800-1000 words, give or take a hundred), we can include it in the fall 2005 issue. Alternatively, 
you could convert it into a review essay, but that would entail adding references and backing up 
the claims you make. In addition, we would have to send it out for external evaluation, which 
does not guarantee acceptance. On our part, we would much prefer that you simply cut the re-
view, but of course it’s up to you. Please let me know what you think. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Philip Redko  
Editorial Assistant  
Journal of Cold War Studies 
 
We got it. There is a post-critical space of multidimensional uniqueness and interlaced 
specificities manifested in the cultural-racist consciousness of friendly-hostile human beings, a 
space created and recreated by an endless collage of scholarly journals and books that publish 
an ever-growing number of highly creative articles and manuscripts. But it seems that the 
greater the diversity of this space and the more colourful its deconstructions, the simpler and 
flatter the reality it seeks to hide.  
 
2. Marxist Encounters 
 
Bulgakov insists that manuscripts don’t burn – but, as Jack London reminds us in The Iron Heel 
(1907), we have no idea how many get suppressed.  
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There was, of course, an easy way out. It was succinctly summarized for us in a precious 
historical moment, when a recently-ordained Doctor of Economic Science, attending the 1997 
American Economic Association Meeting in New Orleans, informed his adulating friends: 
‘There is no such thing as an unpublished paper: you start with the top journal and then work 
your way down until your article gets accepted’. We almost envied his insight.   
Our own path took us sideways, or rather upward, to the Marxists. We submitted the 
rejected review to Science & Society, where it got published as ‘The Rockefeller Boys’ (Bichler 
and Nitzan 2007). We should perhaps note here that, unlike his hands-off Cold War counter-
part, Science & Society’s Editor, David Laibman, was well aware that we were critical of Marx’s 
labour theory of value and its broader implications – yet he remained tolerant and forthcom-
ing. And that wasn’t the first time. 
Back in 1993, one of us (Bichler) had been invited by Asher Arian to contribute a chapter 
to an edited SUNY Press book on the Israeli elections. The invited piece dealt with Israel’s 
‘political business cycle’ – particularly the political-business underpinnings of the 1977 rise of 
the Likud bloc and the radical right and the 1992 attempt to reinstate Rabin’s Labour Party 
and the ‘ancient regime’. The article was reviewed, accepted, proof-edited and ready for the 
printer – yet it never got published. One of SUNY’s trustees got a hold of the preprint and 
presented its editor with an ultimatum: get rid of Bichler’s ‘vulgar Marxian’ chapter or the 
entire volume would be cancelled. Arian complied in a jiffy. Bichler’s chapter was excised, the 
trustee withdrew his ultimatum and the bleached volume sailed safely to the printer.  
The orphaned paper was sent to Science & Society, accompanied by a simple request: kindly 
make sure that the referees are neither Israeli nor pro-Zionist. And it worked. The non-aligned 
reviewers found the article neither vulgar nor Marxist – in fact, they didn’t even think it was 
particularly radical. But they thought it made an original point and agreed to publish it (Bichler 
1994-1995). 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, we had pretty good relationships with Marxist writers 
and editors, particularly those of the older, pre-postist generation. The Review of Radical Political 
Economics, for example, published our article ‘Military Spending and Differential Accumula-
tion: A New Approach to the Political Economy of Armament – The Case of Israel’ (Bichler 
and Nitzan 1996). The paper showed the growing bifurcation between the country’s dominant 
capital groups and the small-business sector that surrounded it. And it further demonstrated – 
for the first time as far as we know – that the differential profits of dominant capital were 
positively and tightly correlated with the country’s increasing military bias and rising military 
spending.  
The Review of Radical Political Economics wasn’t our first choice, though. Initially, we sub-
mitted our article to mainstream journals such as the American Sociological Review and the Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics, but it was repeatedly rejected, often with open disdain (note that, 
back then, most observers equated Israel’s high military spending with its ‘heightened security 
needs’ and thought that connecting these expenditures with the differential profits of dominant 
capital was bizarre, if not utterly nonsensical). The specific reasons for rejection are too em-
barrassing to requote here, but one does merit a mention. A learned reader scolded us for 
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ignoring the innovative empirical work of Michael Shalev – failing to realize that Shalev’s 
main thesis and empirics relied on our own work. . . . 
The Review of Radical Political Economics also published our comparative study ‘Going 
Global: Differential Accumulation and the Great U-turn in South Africa and Israel’ (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2001). The paper developed our non-Marxist, CasP approach to explain the ap-
parent movement of both countries from closed, militarized regimes to a less confrontational 
global order. Surprisingly – and in our view to their great credit – the editors did not seek to 
clip our theoretical ambitions. On the contrary – they encouraged us to develop them further, 
even at the cost of trimming the paper’s concrete historical argument. For a journal that strug-
gled for years to emphasize and develop Marxist research, this encouragement struck us as a 
model of scientific integrity. And it wasn’t alone. Other Marxist journals, such as Capital & 
Class, were also willing to advance our work (Nitzan and Bichler 1996). 
 
3. The Rift 
 
But as the 2000s progressed, our relationship with Marxists cooled off. Many of them started 
to see our CasP approach as a potential foe to both classical Marxism and its many ‘neo’ 
extensions. The rift was further deepened by our studies of U.S. involvement in Middle East 
Energy Conflicts (our term), and of global accumulation more broadly, research that contested 
conventional Marxist notions of neo-imperialism (for example, Bichler and Nitzan 2003b, 
2004a, 2004b, 2012; Nitzan and Bichler 2006). 
And so rejections started to mount. Le Monde, for example, agreed to publish our short 
conference article titled ‘The End of Neoliberalism?’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2003a) – but quickly 
reneged once its Editor in Chief, Serge Marti, got to read the actual text. Similarly, Alternatives 
Internationales commissioned a French version of our ‘War Profits, Peace Dividends and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2002) – only to refuse it for being ‘too econo-
mistic’. That latter paper, re-submitted in English to the London Review of Books, was politely 
turned down by its Editor, Mary-Kay Wilmers, with no reason given. Even the ever-tolerant 
Science & Society rejected an invited article on Imperialism and Financialism – later published 
by the Journal of Critical Globalization Studies (Bichler and Nitzan 2012) – for being ‘too dis-
missive’ of Marxism. (To be fair, the editor later admitted that our submission, once again, 
‘generated something of a hornet’s nest’ at the editorial board meeting, with supporters arguing 
that, given the quality of our work, the journal ‘should be able to accept something from these 
fellows’ and detractors resenting our unsubstantiated attempt to ‘replace the entire Marxist 
tradition rather than develop it’.)  
The growing hostility also spilled over into conferences. The organizers of ‘Marx Interna-
tional IV’ Congress, held in 2004 at the Université de Paris-X Nanterre, placed our CasP 
presentation in one of the conference’s plenary sessions. But when we arrived to deliver it we 
learned that the paper had been demoted to a peripheral panel on Iran and assorted Middle 
East issues. And the organizers were hardly apologetic. One of them informed us that the 
relocation, although unfortunate, was necessary to appease the meeting’s financial backer, a 
distinguished Canadian professor who demanded that we be so removed. 
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A year earlier, in 2003, we presented our CasP approach to a plenary session at the ‘Global 
Regulation’ conference at the University of Sussex. One of the organizers attacked us, quite 
openly, not for the things we said, but for those we didn’t. Standing up and waving his hands, 
he suggested/demanded that we spend less time critiquing Marxism and more on ‘building 
bridges’. At York University, where one of us (Nitzan) teaches and where we hold our inter-
national CasP conferences, the situation is even worse. The conferences, which present new 
and often path-breaking CasP research and critiques from around the world, are routinely 
boycotted by the university’s Marxist faculty.  
Granted, much of this clash has to do with the scientific substance of CasP. Nobody, 
Marxists included, likes being systematically critiqued, let alone supplanted by a new ap-
proach. But it seems to us that some of the enmity has to do with the shifting nature of Marxist 
scholarship as such. With the spread of postism, Marxist editors have grown less tolerant than 
their predecessors and are often openly hostile to scientific research altogether. If true, this 
process bodes ill for the future of this once-innovative science.  
 
4. A Whiff of Plagiarism  
 
And there is another, darker side to this trajectory. Postists love academic fashion, disdain 
novelty and dismiss science. And since according to many (post-)Marxists there is nothing 
new under the eternal sun of Marx, Engels and Lenin, we shouldn’t be surprised to see plagia-
rism rampant.  
The Retort group of Berkeley, California, for example, published a brilliant Verso book on 
the oil wars of the Middle East (Retort 2005) along with a detailed summary in the prestigious 
London Review of Books (Boal et al. 2005). Both works marshalled an impressive array of novel 
theoretical claims and empirical findings – most of which were taken, freely and without at-
tribution, from the works of Bichler and Nitzan.  
Our response article, ‘The Scientist and the Church’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2005), exposed 
Retort’s systemic theft as well as the broader anti-scientific context that made such theft pos-
sible to start with. The London Review of Books, of course, refused to publish it, offering instead 
that we write a 1000-word ‘letter to the editor’. Verso didn’t even bother answering. And Re-
tort? Under pressure from us, the University of California, Berkeley, struck and investigative 
committee that found Retort guilty of scientific dishonesty. But that was it. The honourable 
committee didn’t think its conclusion merited publication. Instead, its report was safely locked 
in the offenders’ personal files for five short years and then permanently purged, to a deep sigh 
of relief from the offenders and their employer. It’s a telling story because Retort’s was neither 
our first nor our last brush with plagiarists. There have been many more, from respectable 
faculty to PhD students – but that’s a subject for another paper.  
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5. Happy Endings, False Restarts  
 
There have also been happy endings, though. In 2016, we received a Rethinking Marxism invi-
tation to write a paper for a special issue on Marxist approaches to the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict. Given that we haven’t researched the subject for many years, we offered, instead, to con-
textualize it as part of the global political economy of the Middle East and the differential 
accumulation of dominant capital groups more broadly. We also proposed that the paper be 
written as a ‘biography of research’, interlacing our theoretical arguments and empirical find-
ings with the way in which they emerged and evolved. To our surprise, the editors agreed 
enthusiastically. 
Two of the three referees disliked our paper. As usual, the issue was our inappropriate 
‘tone’ (read criticism of Marxism), and the offended referees demanded cuts and revisions. 
One of them even boasted a special Bichler-and-Nitzan expertise, developed and perfected 
over the years by reading – and disliking – our publications. We almost felt sorry for the Sisy-
phean scholar. But the issue editors, Oded Nir and Joel Wainwright, didn’t budge. They ac-
cepted our rebuttals and published our paper – ‘Arms and Oil in the Middle East: A Biography 
of Research’ – with only minor modifications (Bichler and Nitzan 2018).  
A short while later, in 2019, we receive another Marxist invitation – this time from the 
bilingual Revue de la régulation. The journal was preparing a special issue on ‘Accumulation 
and Politics: Approaches and Concepts’ and wanted to interview us on a wide variety of top-
ics. The invite seemed genuine. The special issue’s call for papers cited the CasP approach 
favourably and at some length, and the editors were more than forthcoming. They allowed us 
to revise the questions if we wanted to and allowed our text to be significantly longer than 
usual.  
Was this the mark of a new beginning? Were younger Marxists growing more self-critical 
and open to radical alternatives such as CasP? Maybe not – but the invite was simply too 
tempting to ignore. The Revue de la régulation is the flagship journal of the ‘regulation school’, 
a broad attempt to extend Marxist analyses of accumulation beyond the narrow confines of its 
‘material base’. An interview with this journal would have allowed us to introduce our work 
to the next generation of Marxists, as well as to situate it in the context of competing ap-
proaches. All in all, it seemed worthy of our effort, and we spent several intense months writ-
ing it up. 
But it was all for naught. As it turned out, the enthusiastic special-issue editors had only 
‘relative autonomy’. In the ‘last instance’ – meaning when Bichler and Nitzan dismissed Al-
thusser and brushed off other Marxist luminaries – the Editorial Board felt it had to intervene. 
The length of the interview – which was pre-agreed on – was suddenly ‘excessive’ and had to 
be clipped by two-thirds. The questions and answers had to be made more ‘personal’. And 
most importantly, our proverbial ‘tone’ had to be made ‘fairer’ and ‘less one-sided’. Even the 
Journal of Cold War Studies could not have delivered such as decisive knockout.  
Luckily, though, manuscripts don’t burn. ‘The Capital As Power Approach: An Invited-
then-Rejected Interview with Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan’ is available, free of 
changes and charges, on our CreativeCommons website (Bichler and Nitzan 2020). 
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